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 This study examined the current decentralized system in Indonesia for increased disparities in 
educational expenditures across districts.  It also examined the impact of these on the quality of 
education at public junior secondary education.  The study used the most recently available data 
from the Ministry of National Education (MONE) and Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) 
covering 1999/00 and 2002/03.  These data measured district level school expenditures, 
demographic and socio-economic variables. 
 The study found that the current decentralized system in Indonesia increased fiscal 
capacities for education at districts.  Unfortunately, increases in the fiscal capacities for 
education led to increased disparities in education expenditures per student, creating growing 
gaps in fiscal capacities for education across districts.   Districts which received larger general 
allocation funds (DAU) per capita were also more likely to allocate more funding for education, 
whether or not they were poor or wealthy districts.  This fact was reflected by the finding that 
district GRDP per capita in sub-national regions of Java-Bali and Sumatera had no impact on 
districts’ education expenditures per student.  In addition, the sub-provincial districts of the Kota 
(more urban) and Kabupaten (less urban) also differed in the way that they allocated funding for 
education.  The Kota in the Sumatera region tended to allocate significantly more for education 
 iv 
than did the Kabupaten.  At the same time, the Kota in Java-Bali did not allocate significantly 
more for education than the Kabupaten.  
Teacher compensation was national, so funding variance was measured by locally 
controlled variables. The most significant impact on student achievement were teaching and 
learning process expenditures (textbooks, libraries, labs, field trips, etc.).   
The study concluded that increased funding, combined with more efficient budget 
allocations, were keys to quality improvement.  Policy recommendations include: a) targeting 
DAU transfers to reduce the gaps in fiscal capacity for education across districts; b) rewarding 
districts with effective budget allocations that support improved student achievement; and c) 
placing education closer to the center of development and security policy.  Better government 
monitoring and district transparency is needed for this major investment. Improved policy 
research and reporting capacities are needed, including annual reports on decentralization policy 
implementation. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Indonesia is comprised of nearly 13,700 islands. It is divided into 1.8 million square kilometers 
of land area and 7.9 million square kilometers of sea area (including an exclusive economic 
zone).   Based on location and time zone, these areas have been grouped into three regions: 
western, central, and eastern Indonesia (see Figure 1).  Western Indonesia consists of West and 
Central Kalimantan, and all of the provinces in Java and Sumatera.  The central region includes 
East and South Kalimantan, Bali, East and West Nusa Tenggara, and all of the provinces in 
Sulawesi.  The provinces in Maluku and Papua make up eastern Indonesia. 
In 2000, the total population of Indonesia in 2000 was 205.8 million, which included a 
growth rate of 1.49 percent during 1990-2000 (UNESCAP, 2005).  This population increase has 
resulted in an uneven distribution over the regions.  Fifty nine percent of Indonesia’s population 
resides on Java Island, a land area constituting only 7 percent of the country’s land mass.  
Maluku and Papua (Irian Jaya) constitute 24 percent of Indonesia’s total area, but are inhabited 
by only 2 percent of the total population. According to the estimation of Indonesia’s age 
structure in 2004, 29.4 percent of Indonesians were under 14 years of age; 65.5 percent were 
between 15 and 64; and only 5.1 percent were 65 and older.    
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Source : Bureau of Meteorologist and Geo-physics, Jakarta  
Figure 1. Indonesia Regional Division based on Time Zones.  Based on Keppres No. 41, 1987. Effective date: 
January 1st, 1988. 
 
In 2000, Indonesia established a decentralized system that provided opportunities, under 
specific requirements, for some districts/municipalities to have rights to establish their own local 
authorities.  This was reflected in the establishment of several new provinces.  Previously 
Indonesia consisted of 26 provinces (excluding East Timor); today, there are 33 provinces, which 
are made up of 349 districts (kabupaten) and 91 municipalities (kotamadya/cities).  Currently, 
nine Indonesian cities are classified as metropolitan cities that each boosts a population of over 
one million.  Most are located on Java Island: Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Bekasi, Tangerang 
and Semarang.  The rest are located on either Sumatera Island (Medan and Palembang) or 
Sulawesi Island (Makassar).    
Expanding the economic development in an urban area contributes to a rapid urban 
population growth.  Based on a National Development Planning Board (Bappenas) report, 46.01 
percent of the Indonesian population lived in urban areas in 2005.  This figure is expected to 
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increase to 57 percent by 2025.   Since the economic crisis of mid-1997, which devastated the 
Indonesian economy, not only has the population increased but the number of people living 
under poverty line has increased as well especially in urban areas.   Based on a National Socio-
economic Survey conducted in 2000, 13.6 percent of Indonesian urban population living under 
the poverty line in 1996, and by the year 2000 it had increased to 14.58 percent.   
Despite Indonesia’s recent economic growth, there exists an imbalance in economic 
development across the regions.  Table 1 illustrates that, in 2000, West Java was the biggest 
contributor to Indonesia’s Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP), with about 15.8 percent.  
Southeast Sulawesi was the smallest contributor with only 0.4 percent.   Regionally, western 
Indonesia is more populated and has better economic development.  Its GRDP contribution was 
about 82.70 percent of the gross national product (GNP), while other regions contributed only 
17.30 percent combined.   Some researchers argue that this was due to the close proximity of the 
western region to Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia.  This region, therefore, would have the 
advantages of faster and easier access to information, technology, and other materials that would 
ultimately boost regional development.   On the other hand, South Sulawesi, located in the center 
Indonesia, experiences better economic development in its region because South Sulawesi serves 
as the center of transportation and economic activities for the central and eastern regions.  
Commerce and transportation activities for those regions must pass through South Sulawesi. 
Economic development, or the lack of it, affects quality of life; and it becomes 
increasingly important to understand the relationship between the two.  The Human 
Development Index (HDI) measures the quality of life.  Developed by the United Nations (UN), 
this index is composed of life expectancy, adult literacy and GNP per capita.  One of the starling 
revelations of the HDI is that not all of the wealthy countries can be assumed to have high HDI, 
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and vice versa.   Tim Arnold (arnold@stat.ncsu.edu) reports1 that some Arab countries have poor 
HDI as a result of a low literacy rate among women, while some formerly communist countries 
have better HDI as the result of a high literacy rate.  Latin America has low GNPs, but their 
HDIs still fall into the plus range, because they are still enjoying a higher literacy rate and the 
improved health-care investments of earlier years.   
Indonesia also experienced the same phenomenon.  Figure 2 shows that, in 1999, a 
positive correlation existed between the economic development (GRDP per capita) and the 
human development index across the provinces, but that was quite low (r=0.19).  A few of the 
wealthy provinces had access to better human resources.  They had better living conditions and 
opportunities to support the education sector as ways to improve human resources.  Figure 2, 
however, also shows that some provinces with a low GRDP per capita still had a high HDI.  
Southeast Sulawesi, for example, had a GRDP per capita of about Rp.896.27.  Its HDI, however, 
was above the average (62.9).   The condition in which poor provinces such as Southeast 
Sulawesi could still post a high HDI was established under the centralized system of government 
control, which existed prior to 2000.  Under the post-2000 decentralization system, the map of 
this low per capita-high HDI relationship could change.  For example, a wealthy province/district 
that had greater capabilities and more opportunities to provide a better life for its citizens and 
support education sector development drives up the relationship between the HDI and GRDP per 
capita.  Therefore, decentralized system has the potential to increase the social gap between the 
rich and the poor provinces/districts, unless the central government continues to provide 
adequate financial resources to the poor.  One way for the government to reduce district fiscal 
gaps between fiscal need and fiscal capacity would be by providing intergovernmental transfers 
                                                 
1 This report has been posted on Activist's Mailing List (ACTIV-L@UMCVMB) and can be retrieved from 
http://lib.stat.cmu.edu/datasets/humandevel 
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through general allocation funds (DAU).  The districts that receive adequate funding for 
development have more opportunities and capabilities to provide better public services and keep 
the sector development growing, thus providing their citizens with a better quality of life overall, 
including better living conditions, education for children, and employment opportunities .  When 
the fiscal gaps between the poor and the rich districts become wider and wider, the social gaps 
between the rich and the poor districts could also increase.  This way, the intergovernmental 
transfers might be able to reduce the unexpected social gaps between those districts.   
 
7.006.005.004.003.002.001.000.00
GRDP per Capita (in Rp.000)
70.00
65.00
60.00
55.00
HD
I
Papua
Maluku
NTT
NTB
Bali
SE_Slws S_Slws
C_Slws
N_Slws
E_KlmtnS_Klmtn
C_Klmtn
W_Klmtn
E_Java
Yogya
C_Java
W_Java
Jkt
Lmp
Bkl
S_Smtr
Jambi
Riau
W_Smtr
N_Smtr
Aceh
 
 
Data Source : Central Bureau of Statistics 
Figure 2. Human Development Index  (HDI) relative to GRDP per Capita  in 1999 at Constant Price 1993 
 
Regarding education financing, one policy concern is the allocation of sufficient funding 
for education, not only to be able to maintain the existing level of quality of education, but also 
to improve it over time.   In a UNESCO report, Hickling (2001) reported the share of the 
Indonesian GNP for education in 2001 was about 2.74 percent.  Compared to the world standard, 
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Table 1. Population and Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) at constant prices 1993 by province, 2000 
 
Province GRDP Population GRDP per 
  (in Rp.000) % Growth Number % Growth Capita 
     Rate   Rate (in Rp.000) 
DKI Jakarta 59,492,203 14.89 0.0398 8,389,443 4.07 0.002 7.09
West Java 63,149,580 15.8 0.049 43,828,317 21.25 0.001 1.44
Central Java 40,932,538 10.24 0.039 31,228,940 15.14 0.009 1.31
DI Yogyakarta 5,018,093 1.26 0.0402 3,122,268 1.51 0.007 1.61
East Java 57,594,982 14.41 0.0397 34,783,640 16.86 0.007 1.66
JAVA 226,187,395 56.6 0.0416 121,352,608 58.83 0.0051 1.86
Aceh 9,999,017 2.5 0.0049 3,930,905 1.91 0.014 2.54
North Sumatera 24,016,652 6.01 0.0483 11,649,655 5.65 0.013 2.06
West Sumatera 7,868,589 1.97 0.0385 4,248,931 2.06 0.006 1.85
R  i  a  u 21,633,953 5.41 0.0652 4,957,627 2.4 0.041 4.36
Jambi 3,251,212 0.81 0.022 3,314,043 1.61 0.018 0.98
South Sumatera 14,468,495 3.62 0.0592 6,899,675 3.35 0.009 2.10
Bengkulu 1,743,491 0.44 0.0578 1,567,432 0.76 0.029 1.11
Lampung 7,065,799 1.77 0.0279 6,741,439 3.27 0.011 1.05
SUMATERA 90,047,207 22.53 0.0405 43,309,707 21 0.0177 2.08
West Kalimantan 7,275,422 1.82 0.0296 4,034,198 1.96 0.023 1.80
Central Kalimantan 4,133,556 1.03 0.0168 1,857,000 0.9 0.029 2.23
South Kalimanatan 6,333,623 1.58 0.0482 2,985,240 1.45 0.014 2.12
East Kalimantan 21,889,882 5.48 0.019 2,455,120 1.19 0.027 8.92
KALIMANTAN 39,632,483 9.92 0.0284 11,331,558 5.49 0.0232 3.50
North Sulawesi 4,131,705 1.03 0.0622 2,847,142 1.38 -0.021 1.45
Central Sulawesi 2,383,700 0.6 0.0424 2,218,435 1.08 0.026 1.07
South Sulawesi 10,100,508 2.53 0.0488 8,059,627 3.91 0.014 1.25
Southeast Sulawesi 1,672,193 0.42 0.0529 1,821,284 0.88 0.03 0.92
SULAWESI 18,288,105 4.58 0.0516 14,946,488 7.25 0.0126 1.22
Maluku 2,076,087 0.52 -0.0551 1,990,598 0.97 -0.042 1.04
B  a  l  I 7,521,841 1.88 0.0306 3,151,162 1.53 0.013 2.39
West Nusa Tenggara 4,510,571 1.13 0.3418 4,009,261 1.94 0.018 1.13
East Nusa Tenggara 2,946,892 0.74 0.0395 3,952,279 1.92 0.019 0.75
P  a  p  u  a 8,424,572 2.11 0.0322 2,220,934 1.08 0.03 3.79
OTHER 17,958,122 4.49 0.0778 2 15,324,234 7.43 0.0075 1.17
INDONESIA 399,635,154 0.0477 206,264,595  0.0134 1.94
Source : Central Bureau of Statistic 
                                                 
 
2 This growth rate seems to indicate that Eastern Indonesia has a better economic growth than Western Indonesia.  The growth rate of  0.0778, 
however, does not portray the actual growth rate of this region.  This Researcher finds that such a high growth rate occurs simply as the result of a 
low basic GRDP with a high increment of economic growth rate in West Nusa Tenggara.  Therefore, the researcher could say that West Nusa 
Tenggara lies outside in this region. 
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which was more than 4.5 percent, this figure was very low.   John and Morphet (1960) argue that 
when the quantity or quality of education is increased, financial support generally needs to be 
increased.  They also stated that when financial support is restricted, the quantity or quality of 
education is likely to be limited.   
Providing equitable access to a quality education is essential for all segments of the 
population, including the poor and the geographically isolated.  Therefore, because the current 
decentralized system in Indonesia gives the districts authorities to allocate their available funds 
across their development sectors, ensuring equitable and sufficient funds for education sectors 
across districts becomes more important.  Such monitoring would reduce the chance that some 
districts might spend most of their allocation money on construction rather than on education. 
Table 1 also shows that in 2000 there was a disparity in economic growth across the 
provinces. For example, the GRDP per capita of East Nusa Tenggara was about Rp.750.  DKI 
Jakarta, however, had a GRDP per capita of Rp. 7,090 almost 10 times that of East Nusa 
Tenggara.  If such financial disparity across districts exists, then it is necessary to explore 
whether this condition impacts education expenditures.  Studies to identify educational funding 
gaps are not only conducted in the developing countries, like Indonesia, but also done in 
developed countries.   In the USA, for example, some researchers argue that there are still critical 
funding gaps between high- and low-poverty districts.  The Education Trust (2002) reported that 
nationally, districts educating the greatest number of poor students received $966 less per student 
than those in low-poverty districts.  It argues that this significant gap has real consequences for 
the quality of education for low-income children.      
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
By complying with the implementation of the decentralized system, the imbalance in economic 
development may put the Indonesian government at high risk for disparity in regional 
development priorities and financial capabilities in education sector development.  Some local 
authorities may have the ability to finance this sector but others may not.  Even worse, some may 
give less attention to the education sector than to other sector development, despite their 
financial capabilities.   Some districts argue that they need to focus more on physical 
development or infrastructure in order to accelerate economic development in their areas.  
Consequently, if disparities in financial sources increase, disparities in school expenditures are 
most likely going to increase as well.    
Since the amount of funds allocated to a school might impact the school’s efforts to 
improve its educational services, a provision of education financial sources becomes very 
critical.  The current study aims to identify whether the existing decentralized system serves to 
increase disparities in educational expenditures across districts as well as to examine its impact 
on the quality of education.  Quantity may refer to the number of children enrolled, school 
building, teaching-learning materials, and of course, funds for education.  Quality can be 
interpreted as student’s achievement in examinations, teacher performance in class, principal 
performance in school management, etc.  The current study, however, will limit the scope of 
quality to encompass only student achievement in national examinations because of its more 
measurable and accessible data.   
In order to provide a better understanding of the issues, this researcher raises the 
following questions: 
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1. What characteristics of disparities in education expenditures occured across the 
districts?  
2. How do geographic, demographic, and socio-economic characteristics of districts 
impact the disparities in education expenditures? 
3. Do the disparities in education expenditures impact student achievement? 
 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Identifying disparities in education expenditures across districts and providing insight into those 
disparities might help the Indonesian government, as policymaker, in evaluating the current 
mechanisms in place in educational finance. Currently, the government provides such a 
mechanism through two funds: one general (DAU) and one specific (DAK) allocation fund.  The 
DAU and the DAK, both reduce the financial gap between fiscal capacity and fiscal need.  The 
current study, therefore, can contribute to government policy analysis in the following ways: 
First, it can describe the magnitude of the disparities in education expenditures that may 
exist across districts. It can describe how the DAU and DAK achieve their goal of helping 
districts boost their financial capabilities.  The education sector may receive less attention than 
other sectors because of its limited impact on economic development at the local level, 
particularly in the area of job creation.  Therefore, evaluating and enforcing a connection 
between intergovernmental fund transfer and district allocation funds into the education sector is 
needed in order that the districts address their concerns in preparing better human resources as a 
way to boost social and economic development.       
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Second, assuring sufficient funding for the education sector is not merely an attempt to 
maintain the quality of education, but also to increase access to it.  Funds are used to build 
schools, procure school materials, and extend compulsory basic education from six to nine years.  
MONE hopes that, by allocating more funds to education, especially in districts with low 
enrollment rates, it can help boost those enrollment rates.  By analyzing the relationship between 
enrollment rates and funding allocation in education, the Indonesian government may be able to 
adjust the disparities in education expenditures across the districts.  Through this adjustment, 
some districts may even be able to receive more funding. 
Third, understanding the disparities in education expenditures is not merely based on the 
amount of funding received by the schools.  To understand these disparities, other factors should 
also be taken into consideration such as the demographic and socio-economics of the districts.  
The way in which districts allocate funding for the education sector may differ between the poor 
and the rich districts, or between a village (kabupaten) and a city (Kotamadya), or between 
Western and Eastern regions.   By examining such factors, the government will be able to 
recognize the extent to which disparities in education expenditures exist and thereby, reconsider 
these factors in providing sufficient funding for education.  The government may need to require 
some districts to pay more attention to the education sector and to develop specific mechanisms 
for those districts with less financial capabilities. 
Fourth, exploring the schools’ spending behavior is also necessary in understanding 
student achievement in portraying quality of a district ‘s education.  The researcher argues that a 
low quality of education is not merely the result of limited funding, but is also contingent on how 
schools allocate their budget.  The current study, therefore, will explore school budgets in order 
to see how funds are allocated for salaries, teaching-learning or instructional activities, 
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rehabilitation and maintenance, etc.   This may also provide additional insight into a more in-
depth analysis of the relationship between school expenditures and student achievement. 
The researcher hopes that the results of the current study portray what is happening in the 
field, identify common patterns of the problems, and provide possible solutions for those 
problems, especially with regard to the issue of financing for the education sector in Indonesia. 
1.4 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
The current study has a number of limitations which need to be considered when interpreting 
research results and making considerations based on those results.  First, the current study used 
secondary data collected by the Ministry of National Education (MONE) and the Central Bureau 
of Statistics (BPS).  A common issue in using secondary data is its validity.  In the process of 
educational data collection, MONE, through the Center of Informatics, gathers educational data 
by distributing annual questionnaires to regional offices and schools across the country.  The 
questionnaires are returned to MONE for data entry.  Because MONE does not have direct 
control over the process of completing questionnaires completed by schools and regional offices, 
human error may exist.  At the data entry level at MONE, additional human error may also 
occur.  To reduce the risk of human error, MONE re-evaluates and re-validates the output of data 
entry before publishing them into education statistics book. 
 Another limitation of the current study is time lag in gaining up-to-date information from 
the field.  In the current study, this researcher has attempted to obtain the most current 
information available.  Considering the process of data collection mentioned above, a several 
year time lag exist between up-to-date information from the field and the data becoming 
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available at MONE and BPS.  The results of the current study, therefore, may differ from the 
current situation in the field.   Nonetheless, the current study may assist in providing a better 
picture about education finance and in recognizing possible problems that exist in the field. 
 The current study used two different sources of data: MONE and BPS.  Because of the 
different mechanisms in data collection by both offices, the current study also has a limitation in 
data flexibility in terms of the year in which the data were published.  The researcher matched 
data from MONE and BPS in the same year the data were published.  The current study, 
therefore, used data estimation techniques.  For example, the educational data used was collected 
from the academic year 2002/03.  The demographic data available at BPS was from the 2000 
census.  In order for both sets of data to match, this researcher estimated the demographic data of 
2002/03.   
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2.0  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 A PROCESS OF DECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA 
There are three forms of decentralization system: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution 
(Winkler, 1989; Fiske, 1996; Florestal and Cooper, 1997; McGinn and Welsh, 1999). 
Deconcentration refers to a transfer of authority to lower levels within the central government 
agencies.   This system is nothing more than a shifting of management responsibilities from the 
central government to the regional government or an expansion of central authority to the region.   
In the case of Indonesia, for example, under a centralized system the Ministry of National 
Education had branch offices in each province (called Kanwil) and at each district (called 
Kandep).  The branch offices implemented all programs provided by the ministry. They had to 
consult and request for the ministry’s approval for any changes in programs and budgets. This 
indicates that the central ministry remained firmly in control.  The local authorities had little or 
no say at all in designing programs and allocating funds.  
Delegation is a more extensive approach in which the central authority lends or transfers 
the authority to lower levels of government or even to autonomous organizations such as public 
corporations or regional development agencies.  In the education sector, the most commonly 
delegated areas are vocational and higher education.  In Brazil, for example, SENAI – an 
autonomous training agency - is typically assigned to do vocational trainings and report to a 
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board of directors rather than any particular minister (Winkler, 1989).  Similarly, universities are 
also autonomous bodies carrying out higher education under a delegation agreement. 
Finally, the most effective form of decentralization in transferring power to local 
authority is devolution.  This form implies the creation of autonomous and independent sub-
national units of government, which have authority to raise revenues and spend resources.  The 
local authorities, therefore, would be more powerful than those in the two previous forms of 
decentralization. A process of shifting authority from de-concentration to devolution, for 
example, occurred in Indonesia during the year 2000.  Starting with the Indonesian economic 
crisis and followed by the fall of Suharto’s regime, there were strong pressures and demands 
from local authorities to have broader regional autonomies and fiscal authorities. This condition 
pushed the Indonesian government to shift its governmental system gradually from a centralized 
to a fully decentralized system.  This process could bring the government closer to their 
constituents so that government services can be delivered more effectively and efficiently 
(Usman, 2001).   
One assumption driving this process is that local authorities have better knowledge of 
local conditions, characteristics, and preferences than does the central government.    Florestal 
and Cooper (1997, p.3) list four key features of devolution: the body that exercises responsibility 
is legally separate from the central ministry; the body acts on its own, not under the hierarchical 
supervision of the central ministry; the body can exercise only the powers given to it by law; and 
the body can act only within the geographic limits set out by the law. 
The concept of decentralization in Indonesia is actually not a recent phenomenon. As a 
part of the decentralization initiative, President Habibie, who replaced President Soeharto, 
established two sets of government laws: the Regional Governance Law No. 22/1999 and the 
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Fiscal Decentralization Law No. 25/1999 as legal frameworks for the devolution process.  
According to the Law no. 22/1999, the hierarchical relationship among provinces and districts 
was abolished. All districts become fully autonomous and responsible for the planning, 
managing, financing and delivering of most public services, including education, health, and 
infrastructure.  Based on this law, the central government will only be responsible for the judicial 
system, religious affairs, national defense and security, fiscal and monetary affairs, international 
diplomatic relationships as well as the macroeconomic planning and standardization. All other 
responsibilities will be handled by local governments.  Local autonomy, therefore, is no longer 
defined as the responsibility to support national development, but rather the rights of the locals to 
make decisions over responsibilities within their jurisdiction.  It also indicates that the reform is 
not merely transferring administrative authority, but also transferring political power to the local 
governments.  This becomes more visible when Law 22 of 1999 was revised as the Law 32 of 
2004 that allows direct election of sub-national leaders. 
The concept of three levels of local government – province, district, and municipality – 
were already introduced under the Local Government Act no. 18/1965 (UNESCAP, 2005).  It 
was mentioned that the local government would have full autonomy.   Due to a change in the 
national government at that time, a process of local autonomy had not yet been implemented 
until the year 1974 when the Local Government Act no. 5/1974 was issued.  Under this law, a 
local autonomy was established to increase efficiency and productivity, especially in executing 
the process of development, providing public services and maintaining political stability as well 
as national integrity (UNESCAP, 2005).  Many government functions, however, were still 
carried out by the central government agencies in provinces and districts.  Most local decisions, 
therefore, were made by central government and did not necessarily reflect local preferences.  It 
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indicated that the national government was still very much in control, and choices at the local 
level were substantially constrained (Ranis and Steward ,1994; Alm, Aten and Bahl, 2001). 
Consequently, the so-called autonomy was more of a de-concentrated form of decentralization 
rather than devolutionary.        
2.1.1 Forces behind the Decentralization of Educational System. 
One consequence of the devolutionary decentralization process in Indonesia is that the local 
government now has to fully shoulder the responsibility of the tasks and functions assigned to 
them, including the development of the educational sector. According to Education Law 
20/2003, the principal responsibilities, authority, and resources for the delivery of education are 
transferred to lower levels of government, while some decision-making power is transferred to 
schools (World Bank, 2004). One of the reasons to decentralize the education sector is that local 
authorities, which are closer to the schools, hopefully can precisely and quickly determine what 
the schools need.   
Florestal and Cooper (1997) argue that there are a variety of reasons why countries 
decentralize their basic education systems: to save money and improve management efficiency 
and flexibility; to transfer responsibility to the most capable level of government; to raise 
required revenues; to conform with a wider administrative reform or with the general principle 
that administrative responsibility should be vested in the lowest capable level of government; to 
give users a greater voice in decisions that affect them; and to better recognize local linguistic or 
ethnic diversity.  Winkler (1989) more specifically categorizes the rationale for education 
decentralization into three groups: (i) efficiency and effectiveness, (ii) educational finance, and 
(iii) redistribution of political power.  
  16
It is a common argument that transferring decision-making power to local authority is a 
way to increase efficiency and effectiveness.  Efficiency can be defined as a way to make the 
best use of scarce resources to achieve given ends (Thomas in Guthrie, 1980, p. 148).  Thomas 
argues that an increase in efficiency may result from procedures that increase goal attainment 
with no increase in cost, reduce cost without reducing goal attainment, or enhance goal 
attainment while also reducing costs.  From the efficiency point of view, high unit costs of 
primary and secondary education provided by the central government become a main argument 
for decentralizing education (Winkler, 1989; Burki, Perry and Dillinger, 1999).  There are some 
reasons behind this argument: (i) Since the capacity of national government to manage and 
supervise the education system is inadequate or weak,  the transfer of the responsibilities to local 
authorities may increase the accountability of the school to improve its performance. (ii) The 
costs of decision-making in a system where even the most minor local education matters must be 
decided by a geographically and culturally distant bureaucracy in the capital city; and (iii) Prices 
and production processes may vary across the regions. Therefore, implementation of national 
standards for curriculum, construction, and teacher quality that are designed by the ministry of 
national education could prevent cost savings since they would preclude adjustment of 
educational inputs from local or regional price difference.  Thus, by letting the local authorities 
allocate budgets across inputs there will be an increase in efficiency.      
From the effectiveness point of view, decentralizing education can be seen as a way to 
increase school responsiveness to the parents’ and local communities’ requirements and 
eliminate the need for central government decisions on local education matters (Winkler, 1989).  
This means, the school should be able to fit the educational inputs to the preferred outputs, and 
decide what the important inputs into the educational process should be.  The school, therefore, 
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requires strong leadership, well-prepared school planning, provision of resources, support for 
decisions, and monitoring (Brown, 1990).  By giving more power to the school through the 
decentralization process, there will be an increase in the school effectiveness.       
One example of decentralization of the education sector is Chile. Chile’s education 
reform in 1980 was aimed at increasing efficiency and effectiveness in the country’s education 
sector. The reform was made through the transfer of responsibility for school management from 
the Ministry of Education to the municipalities.  Municipalities became responsible for the hiring 
and firing of staff (including school heads) as well as wage setting and the purchase of supplies. 
The central government retained responsibility for drawing up general regulations (minimum 
curriculum, universal coverage condition, etc), as well as the tasks of administrative and 
technical supervision, and the provision of basic finance for the sector (Larranaga, 1996).    
According to Castaneda (1991 in Larranaga, p. 4), the main objective of the reform was to solve 
the following problems of the centralized system: (i) low quality and efficiency levels associated 
with a lack of systemic incentives for attracting and retaining students; (ii) low teacher salaries as 
a result of high administration costs; (iii) inadequate supervision of both schools and teachers; 
(iv) rigid study programs that did not respond to local needs; and (v) low level of community 
participation in schools issues. 
Fiscal constraints can be another reason to decentralize the education sector.  When the 
proportion of school-age children enrolled in primary and secondary schools increases, the 
educational expenditures are most likely to increase as well. If the central government is more 
responsible for the development of the education sector then it may face severe fiscal constraints 
to continue the expansion of education opportunities (Winkler, 1989).  Winkler (1989) argues 
that shifting a part of the burden for support of primary and secondary education to sub-national 
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units of government, to community and voluntary organizations, and to parents has become an 
increasingly attractive alternative.  By sharing responsibilities for education, the local units, 
hopefully, will be more motivated to collect more funds for education due to a greater sense of 
belonging to the schools.  They can spend the funds more wisely and monitor the outcomes more 
closely.  Education reform in Argentina in 1978, for example, was mainly driven by financial 
reasons (Filmus, 1998 in Gorostiaga, Acedo, and Xifra, 2003).   The reform was done by 
transferring responsibility for the national primary schools to the provinces.  It continued 
transferring all national secondary schools and post secondary institution in 1992.  Gorostiaga, 
Acedo, and Xifra (2003) noted that the provinces agreed to receive the national secondary and 
post-secondary system, but were not given specific resources to face the economic effort.  One 
argument behind this national government policy was that significant increases in tax collection 
in 1991 would give more resources for the provinces that allowed them to finance the 
administration of the transferred schools (Senen, Gonzalez and Arango, 1997 in Gorostiaga, 
Acedo, and Xifra, 2003).  
Another argument for decentralizing education sector is redistribution of political power.  
This argument is rarely stated as the reason, but democratization or inclusion of marginal groups 
in society is frequently stated as the goal (Winkler, 1989).   McGinn and Street (1986 in Winkler, 
1989) argue that redistribution of political power is the primary objective of decentralization by 
empowering such groups in society who support central government policies, or weakening 
groups who oppose the policies.  The decentralized education sector in Mexico, for example, was 
aimed at reducing the power of the national teacher union by transferring salary negotiations 
from central to the state government level (Winkler, 1989).    
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Referring to Winkler’s arguments, the Indonesian decentralized education sector was 
driven by two reasons: (i) increasing efficiency and effectiveness, and (ii) redistributing political 
power.  Given the heterogeneity of cultures and ethnic groups and the large geographical scale of 
Indonesia, the central government most likely does not have sufficient knowledge of all local 
conditions.  Efficiency and effectiveness, thus, becomes the main argument for decentralizing the 
education sector.  Lack of laboratory equipment and poor teacher distributions, for example, 
were the results of inefficiency and ineffectiveness inherent in the previous system.  Citing 
reasons of “economies of scale” and “scarce” items, the ministry of national education procured 
the laboratory equipments centrally.  The ministry then distributed the items to the schools 
through districts.  The ministry argued that when the purchase of the items was centrally pooled, 
then it could reduce the total cost.  However, it became inefficient when the cost increased due to 
the high cost of delivery from the central government to local schools.  There were even 
instances where the schools received late delivery due to geographical barriers.     
A long history of poor teacher distribution is also an example of the ineffectiveness of the 
Indonesian centralized education system.  Under the centralized system, the ministry was 
responsible for recruiting and distributing teachers to schools.  Due to lack of information 
regarding the school needs, some schools had too many teachers in one subject but too few in 
others.  Unfortunately, the school principals could not change teachers to attract those with 
needed credentials.  Some teachers, therefore, would teach subject matters without any 
appropriate academic background.  This condition, therefore, increased the teacher mismatch 
problem and lowered the quality of education.  The existence of the teacher mismatch problem, 
however, is not merely due to poor teacher distribution.  A lag between development of new 
curriculum and the availability of appropriate teachers in schools also most likely contributed to 
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the existing problem.  Schools were often not ready to implement the new curriculum because of 
inadequate time to disseminate the new curriculum to the teachers, and few in-service training 
opportunities.  Moreover, teacher institutions were also not ready to support the new curriculum 
in their pre-service program.  Thus, the problem of teacher or subject mismatch is a complex 
one. There was a possibility that by transferring the responsibility for teacher deployment to the 
districts that the mismatch problem could be decreased and the effectiveness of teacher 
distribution could be increased. Establishing good coordination among the center for curriculum 
development, schools, districts and teacher institutions also required more attention.    
On the other side, political considerations were also hidden factors behind the process of 
decentralization in Indonesia.  Following the fall of Suharto’s regime and the economic crisis, 
there were strong pressures from the local governments to have broader autonomy and fiscal 
authority.  In order to prevent separatist political movement, the central government, led by 
President Habibie at that time, introduced the idea of devolutionizing authority to the local 
governments.  Based on Regional Governance Law No. 22/1999, most of the authority for the 
development sectors was transferred to local governments, including primary and junior 
secondary education.   
At the same time, however, there was also a national goal of compulsory basic education 
programs for a nine-year formal basic education up from six. Not all local governments, 
however, were ready to develop the education sector using their own resources.  Low student 
enrollment rates and untrained teachers, insufficient school facilities, etc, as well as weak 
financial resources became critical factors for transferring responsibility for the education sector 
to local authorities.  Pushing all development sectors to local authorities at one time, rather than 
in a gradual process, however, may increase financial and administrative burdens for ministry 
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authorities.  The World Bank (2004) commented that Indonesia’s new systems allowed local 
governments to produce the services transferred to them under the decentralization reform were 
just beginning to emerge.  There was, however, no national strategy to encourage or disseminate 
good practices.  Insufficiently trained and experienced staff to carry out their new and expanded 
roles also becomes a concern in part due to a lack of in-service support from local universities.   
Moreover, since the Ministry of Education had no regulatory authority over local districts, the 
development of the education sector was likely to receive less attention compared to other job 
creating development sectors, such as road and building construction.  Referring to the argument 
of John and Morphet (1960) that the increase in quantity and quality of education generally 
should be followed by financial support, disparities in quality of education across districts were 
thus likely to become a new problem in Indonesia. 
Any policy reform that changes from one condition toward the hope for better condition 
needs an appropriate strategy or plan.  In decentralizing education, for example, there are many 
strategies or ways of thinking.  McClure and Triaswati (2001) suggested two approaches that 
may be used in decentralizing the education sector in Indonesia: (a) shifting tactics, and (b) 
shifting strategy.   The tactical approach focused on restructuring the government system by 
reproducing and miniaturizing existing hierarchies. The strategic approach focused on building 
professional networks.    In the centralized system, many schools in Indonesia had “bad 
experiences” of a long line and complexity of bureaucracy.  By shifting the strategic mission 
through transferring authority to a more grassroots level and leaving the traditional 
organizational relationships of mandates (McClure and Triaswati, 2001), the schools could have 
quick responses and received better compliance with their needs which should increase school 
effectiveness.      
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Concerning the fiscal gap between education needs and resources and the increasing 
complexity of the Indonesian political economy, McClure and Triaswati (2001) argue that “the 
Indonesian government (GOI) needed to reach out to provinces and districts to form an inclusive 
generational strategy that built network of adults who advocated and generated resources for 
good schools” (p.15). They suggested that shifting of strategic vision could be done through 
creating intergovernmental peer networks for collaborative learning of professionals.  This 
strategy, therefore, is essential as McClure and Triaswati  (2001) argue : 
“Moving from mandates to partnerships will require new forms of cooperation.  One way 
of initiating public and professional dialogue about a strategic vision for education is to 
think about the fundamental importance of learning and knowledge to the sustainability 
of civil societies…….The education community needs to keep a strategic vision with 
large, long-term goals in front of the public to help ensure a public commitment to 
taxation.  Decentralization brings new opportunities for entire communities to take 
greater public responsibility for the education for children” (p. 15).    
 
The effort to build a clear strategic vision, therefore, could strengthen public confidence 
on how their money – channeled through taxation – will be invested.  McClure and Triaswati 
(2001) suggest that an effective education finance strategy that improves the quality of basic 
education for all of Indonesia’ children will require a broad generational coalition of concerned 
educational policymakers, professionals and parents (p. 15).    
2.2 FINANCING THE EDUCATIONAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT  
Adequate financial resources for education are essential when transferring responsibility for the 
educational sector to local authorities. Chile, for example, designed its own mechanism to 
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finance its education sector. A per-capita subsidy was used for transferring financial resources to 
education establishments.  It plays a central role in the working of Chile’s decentralized system.  
The subsidy is structured in a rate system which takes account of difference in the cost of 
providing the service according to the type and level of education, as well as the geographical 
location of the school (Larranaga, 1996).  The subsidy mechanism pays a flat rate per student 
attending each municipal or private subsidized school. Gropello (2004) also noted that the 
responsibility for the delivery of education in Chile was transferred to the municipalities through 
specific agreements, and there was an attempt to reward municipal performance by tying central 
resources to the number of student attending class. 
In compliance with the reform in Indonesian government infrastructures under the 
decentralized system, an effort to provide revenues for local authorities was set up under the 
Fiscal Decentralization Law No. 25/1999.  This law aims to both transfer additional funds to 
regional/local governments, and to provide some equalization of revenues.  Under this law, the 
two previous intergovernmental funds, a subsidy for autonomous region (SDO) – largely used 
for local civil servant salaries (including teachers’ salaries) and region recurrent expenditures -- 
and a general development transfer (INPRES) – aimed at financing regional development, were 
eliminated.  These two funds, then, were combined into a general allocation fund (DAU).  This 
law, together with Law 34/2000 (Local Government Taxes and Charges), also provided 
opportunities for local governments (provincial and districts/municipal) to raise their own 
revenues from various sources such as local taxes, local charges, locally-owned enterprise profit, 
and other eligible local revenues.   
Currently, there are three sources for intergovernmental funds in Indonesia: a) natural 
resources revenue sharing, b) a general allocation fund (DAU), and c) a specific allocation fund 
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(DAK).  Due to limited available natural resources across the provinces and a limited use of 
DAK, then DAU becomes the most available funding source for local governments.  The DAU is 
a grant aiming to equalize fiscal capacities of regional government to deliver public services.  It 
is determined based on a fiscal gap as the difference between fiscal needs and fiscal capacities of 
regional government.  Twenty five percent of net domestic revenue (total domestic revenue 
minus revenue sharing) in the central government budget is allocated for the DAU.   From that 
amount, 10 percent is allocated to provincial governments and 90 percent to district/municipal 
governments.  The World Bank (2003) commented that neither the 25 percent share of total 
revenues, nor the distribution of the DAU to provinces and local governments was based on a 
thorough analysis of the expenditure needs of the regions.  In practice, the use of DAU really 
depends on the local government’s prioritizing.  The central government does not have enough 
power to specify the amount allocated of DAU for a specific purpose, such as education.   
A possible fund in which the central government can control the local government is 
DAK.  Law 25/1999 states that the DAK can be used for special needs of the regions, including 
emergencies, and for financing central priorities at the regional level.  This fund, therefore, is 
intended to finance projects on reforestation, education, health, rural road, and irrigation.  The 
DAK, however, is limited and need some counterpart or sharing from the local government, in 
which the local governments have to provide at least 10 percent of the total amount on their own 
(a matching grant).  Local governments have high dependency upon the DAU (Brodjonegoro, 
2004).   Therefore, it would be interesting to recognize the percentage of DAU for education 
sector development at district level in respect to accelerating student enrollment rates as part of a 
compulsory basic education program. 
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McClure and Triaswati (2001) argued that the basic education finance system in 
Indonesia suffered from problems of vertical fiscal imbalances and horizontal inequities.  They 
stated that vertical fiscal imbalances occurred when the central government placed the burden of 
education on local governments without also providing them adequate taxing authority.  They 
also argued that horizontal inequalities were created by the Indonesia’s provincial economies that 
generated widely disparate per capita resources. Usman (2001) also argued that decentralization 
over budgetary matters was mainly applied to the expenditure side, not to the revenue side, so 
there is no increased capacity of local government to tax income or assets.   He concluded that 
although the regions now have the authority to decide how to allocate their budget, they have 
been given no new revenue-raising powers.  He found that the increment in local taxes and levies 
have not been matched by the provision of better services of local government.   
 
Table 2. Source of Local Government Revenues. 
 
Before Law No. 25/1999 Under Law No. 25/1999 
1. Fiscal Transfer from Central Government  
a.   Regional Autonomous Subsidy (SDO) 
b.  Inpres Grant (for village, district, and 
provincial governments) 
c.   Revenue sharing of Property Tax (on land 
and building). 
1.Fiscal Transfer from Central Govt: 
a.  General Block Grant (DAU) 
b.  Specific Grant (DAK) 
c. Revenue Sharing from natural Resources 
and Property Tax 
2. Local Own-revenues: 
a.  Local Taxes and Retributions (Law no. 
18/1997) 
b. Revenues from local state-owned companies 
2. Local Own-revenues: 
a.  Local Taxes and Retributions (law no. 
18/2001) 
b. Revenues from Local State-owned companies 
3.  Local Borrowing 3.  Local Borrowing 
Source : Alm and Indrawati (2000). 
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In addition, regionally generated revenues (PAD) – primary consisting of taxes, user 
charges and income from regional enterprises – had insignificant contributions to local revenue 
sources (Brodjonegoro, 2004; World Bank, 2003).   The absence of property taxes (land and 
building) from the list of regional taxes contributed to the insignificance of PAD contribution. 
These taxes were collected and shared with the regions by the central tax authority (World Bank, 
2003).   This condition, thus, made local governments heavily dependent on the central 
government transfer through DAU for their sources of fund.      
2.2.1 Decentralized System and Disparities in Education Expenditures 
There are many factors that might contribute to the increase in the disparities.   
Differences in geographic, demographic and social-economic background of the districts might 
be factors causing these disparities.   Parrish, Matsumo and Fowler (1995) argued that factors 
such as wealth and poverty status, metropolitan status, geographic region, median household 
income, education attainment, etc. should be taken into consideration in order to ensure the 
provision of some level of adequate or appropriate services in education sector.  They asserted  
positive relationships between expenditures and wealth.  Wealthy communities have a greater 
capacity to support public education services through local revenues.  On the other hand, it is not 
surprising that there is a negative relationship between local revenues per student and the 
percentage of school-age children in poverty.   
In the US, for example, in Pennsylvania, the state and local revenues available per 
student for education in the lowest-poverty districts were around 1.2 times greater than those in 
the highest-poverty districts (The US Department of Education, 1999-2000).  The funding gap 
was around $1,248 per student.  State and federal funds allocations, therefore, have a much 
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stronger equalizing influence in reducing differences created by poverty.    In the US, wealthy 
suburban districts receive more support from local resources than other districts. Rural districts 
receive more support from state sources and urban districts more federal support than other 
districts.    The National Central for Education Statistics (NCES, 1995) reported that federal 
funds in high poverty districts exceed those in low poverty districts by more than a multiple of 
four.     
In regard to the provision of local funds for education, the geographic region could also 
be considered for allocating education funds.  Parrish, Matsumo, and Fowler (1995) identified 
that school district spending in the US substantially varied by geographic region, with the South 
and West region receiving larger amounts of federal funds compared to the Northeast and 
Midwest regions.   The level of education attainment of households also has an impact on the 
willingness of local support for providing funds for education.  Parrish, Matsumo, and Fowler 
(1995) find that districts with the lowest average education attainment showed the least support 
from local revenues and the most from state and federal sources.    
Providing adequate public funds for education, therefore, is critical.  In the US, tax 
revenues are important financial sources to support the education sector.    There are many kinds 
of local taxes, such as sales, income, and property taxes.  Local property taxes are the biggest 
source of funding for education in the US, supplying a third of the budgets for public K-12 
education (US census bureau 1998).   Odden (1999, in Goertz and Odden, p.155), however, 
notices that local education tax base, usually property wealth per pupil, varies widely across 
districts within states and provinces.  He argues that this condition, therefore, makes local school 
districts face different challenges in raising education revenues and spending on education 
programs.  Low-wealth districts often had low levels of expenditures even with high tax rates, 
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whereas high-wealth districts often had high levels of per pupil expenditures even with low tax 
rates.   
With regards to the Indonesian case, the disparity of financial resources across the 
provinces/districts may impact the national agenda on education sector.  Since 1993/94, the 
Indonesian government launched a nine-year compulsory basic education program.  This 
program aims to urge all Indonesian children between the ages of 7 and 15 to have at least nine 
years of basic education, covering primary and junior secondary education.  The percentage of 
children who are already enrolled in school in such a region is reflected by its gross enrollment 
rate (GER).  The GER at junior secondary level, for example, is calculated by dividing all 
students at the junior secondary level by all 13-15 year-old children.    
Based on the GER, the central government mandated that the local governments with low 
GERs should make specific efforts in order to reach a national standard of enrollment rate, which 
states that at least 95 percent of the children must enroll in formal education.  This completion is 
called as Tuntas Paripurna.  Since the decentralized system assigned the power to the local 
governments to decide how they allocate their budget, then it is important to know how much 
effort has been spent to reach this goal – in other words, how much of their budgets are allocated 
to the local education sector. 
Figure 3 illustrates that generally the participation rate at primary school in 2000 across 
the provinces approaches 100 percent, even more.  In contrast, the participation rate at the junior 
secondary remains low.  Even if they increase, the increment is too slow.  Considering that the 
population of age 13-15 has continued to grow, then, the low increment of the secondary GER 
means that the absolute number of those without access to secondary school has increased.   
When the primary GER increases, meaning most primary school-age children have been 
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enrolled, the educational policies can now focus on improving the quality and achievement of the 
primary education, such as improved curricula, better school management and more efficient use 
of resources.  As a result, the number graduating from the primary school increases.  The 
competition for secondary-school places become intensive and it creates the demand for 
secondary-school places.  Under the current decentralized system, then, the local governments 
need to think how to finance secondary-school expansion.           
   As part of the secondary-school expansion that might include more students and be less 
selective, the local government should address the quality of student achievement by improving 
the secondary education curricula.  The development of curricula, of course, not only gives 
students new knowledge, but also prepares them for globalization and provides them competency 
and employment opportunities in labor markets which require certain skills, language abilities, 
technologies, etc.   
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Data source : Central for informatics, Ministry of National Education 
Figure 3.  Gross Enrollment Rate for Primary and Junior Secondary School across the Provinces, 2000/01 
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 Figure 4 shows that although some provinces which have high GRDP per capita also tend 
to have high GER at the junior secondary level, in general the economic development in 
provinces does not have a high correlation to the gross enrollment rate (r=0.17).  Southeast 
Sulawesi, for example, had a GRDP per capita in 2000 of about Rp.918.14.  Its GER in 2000/01, 
however, was above the median (82.24).   This situation, of course, might be explained by the 
policy  of  the  central  government  during  the  previous  regime  to  force  local governments to   
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Data sources : Center of Informatics, MONE and Central Bureau of Statistics 
Figure 4.  The growth of GER JSS relative to GRDP per Capita by provinces in 2000 
 
accelerate the compulsory basic education programs.  The central government subsidized the 
poor provinces in order to make this program successful.  Since implementation of 
decentralization just began in 2000, then, the growth of GER is just a carry-over from the 
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previous year.   The effort in increasing the GER should therefore receive special attention since 
local governments would have more power in controlling the development budget.  Allocating 
development budget into the education sector, especially at the junior secondary level, may 
contribute to the effort to accelerate a nine-year compulsory basic education program. 
With reference to some of the above aspects, the investment at the secondary level related 
to the structural features of secondary-school systems and their financing is really critical.  
Lewin and Caillods (2001 in Lewin and Caillods, 2001) argue that there are some points that 
could be seen as a linkage between social-sector and governmental spending with the education 
sector funding.  First, when government revenues are limited or squeezed, the absolute level of 
investment in education will decline.  Since most recurrent expenditure is in salaries, then the 
real value of teachers’ salaries may deteriorate. This condition, of course, will influence the 
commitment and performance of teachers in classrooms, which will, in turn, effect student 
achievement.  Second, when the proportion of salary as a recurrent expenditure rises, the capital 
spending including budget for learning materials is likely to decline.  This situation also will 
negatively influence both quality and achievement. Third, government policy priorities in the 
education sector will help distribute investment across levels of education.  For example, if the 
government gives priority to primary education as part of universalized basic education, then 
secondary education could receive less attention.  Fourth, as education expenditures are limited 
in most poor countries, the option of gaining external support or donor agencies becomes 
virtually the only source of developmental initiatives at the secondary level, otherwise the 
infrastructure will deteriorate.  Such reformed methods of financing, therefore, are needed in 
order to maintain sustainable expansion. 
  32
2.2.2 Decentralized System and Quality of Education 
After exploring the factors that might contribute to increasing disparities in educational 
expenditures, it is very useful to recognize the impact of the disparities in school expenditures on 
school performance.  It has been known that the amount of money spent on education can give 
schools opportunities to enhance educational resources.  The improvement of educational 
resources, may be termed educational inputs, may produce better quality of education.     
Concerning the relationship between education expenditures and student achievements, 
some researchers argue that it would depend on the allocated education expenditures efficiently.  
A schools that efficiently allocates resources will purchase that combination of inputs which 
maximizes the potential educational impact of its budget (Levin, 1970 in John, Goffman, 
Alexander and Stollar, p. 191). Allocating more funds to the teaching-learning process provides 
more opportunities for schools to provide better facilities and services which correlate highly 
with student achievement.  John and Morphet (1960) also argues that when providing additional 
educational inputs will cost money to obtain, then if each of additional inputs is unrelated to 
increasing performance, one might draw to a conclusion that significant inefficiency exists in 
schools.  It is common, therefore, to ask whether additional funds spent on education provides 
better quality of education and improves student achievement. 
It would be also interesting to see whether a decentralized system would impact the 
priorities that schools place upon their expenditures.   Some schools may prioritize improvement 
in their facilities or teaching materials as a way to improve student performance; while other 
schools may focus on renovating their buildings, etc.  Concerning the school expenditure 
allocation, there are some sub-components of expenditures in which the schools in Indonesia 
spend their money.  These sub-components can be categorized into teacher salaries, the teaching-
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learning process, maintenance and rehabilitation, and others.  The existence of disparities in 
educational expenditures, therefore, may impact on how the schools invest their money across 
the sub-components.  As a result, it would also be interesting to recognize the impact of the 
educational spending to the educational outputs.   
In general, the term “educational output” will refer to educational quality.  The term of 
“quality” itself, however, does not have a standard definition.  Different people might have 
different interpretation.  Some think of quality only in terms of academic achievement of pupils 
in schools, whereas others insist that quality be judged by all-round development and progress as 
well as by knowledge of pupils (John and Morphet, 1960, p. 14).  Adams (2002b) also argues 
that education quality may refer to inputs (number of teachers, amount of teacher training, 
number of textbooks), processes (amount of direct instructional time, extent of active learning), 
outputs (test scores, graduation rates), and outcomes (performance in subsequent employment). 
In more comprehensive views, he also argues that quality of education can be interpreted based 
on an institution’s programs’ reputation, the extent to which schooling has influenced change in 
student knowledge, attitudes, values, and behavior, or a complete theory or ideology of 
acquisition and application of learning (1998 in Adams, 2002b).  In this current study, the 
researcher defined the quality of education as student performances reflected by national 
examination scores (NES) as one of final outputs in teaching-learning process. 
In addition, when the “quality of education” is linked to the educational cost, there tend 
to be greater differences in opinion.  Some people will argue that increasing quality is likely to 
add somewhat to the cost, but fewer would agree that increasing the cost would necessarily add 
to the quality.   When disparities in educational cost are large, therefore, it is common to ask 
whether a larger educational expenditure per student result in better quality.  John and Morphet 
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(1960) report that some studies find that educational quality does not always relate to educational 
cost.  Their arguments are based on the following conditions.  First, small schools tend to cost 
more per pupil than average or larger sized schools (Rosenstengel and Eastmond, 1957) and 
reduction in class size does not always increase student performance (Odden and Picus, 1992, 
p.278).  Some believe that larger units are more cost-effective and more educationally efficient.  
In larger units, teachers could specialize and schools could offer a broader course of studies.    
Second, in some school systems, inept leadership and administration may adversely 
affect the quality of education.  Good leadership and management must be combined with 
adequate and soundly conceived financial support in order to produce a good education program.  
Inept leadership often means perpetuation of undesirable and inequitable practices, inefficiency 
in development and management of resources and, consequently unsatisfactory educational 
opportunities (John and Morphet, 1960, pp. 10-11).  In addition, incompetence and less qualified 
teachers can impact the quality of education.  Low morale of teachers and other school 
employees may result in relatively low quality of services in education.   John and Morphet, 
therefore, argue that quality may be affected in some extent by a number of factors that are not 
directly related to finance. 
Moreover, Hanushek (1996) also supports a conclusion that there is no consistent 
relationship between school resources and student performance.   His conclusion is based on a 
summary of the results of his exploration of 377 studies on the effects of school resources on 
student performance.  He states that since three educational inputs – student-teacher ratio, 
teacher education, and teacher salary – are combined to indicate variations in instructional 
expenditure per student, the results lead to the conclusion that no strong or systematic 
relationship exists between spending and student performance (Hanushek in Gary Burtless, 1996, 
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p. 56).  He finds that the estimated effects of various measures of resources are either statistically 
insignificant, or, more frequently, statistically significant but with an unexpected sign.     
Hanushek’s arguments of an insignificant cost-quality relationship bring controversies 
among researchers.  Many current studies arrive at conclusions which refute his findings.  These 
studies suggest that there is a strong and substantially positive relation between educational 
resource inputs and academic achievement (Hedges and Greenwald, 1996; Lee and Barro, 2001; 
Wendling and Cohen, 1981).   Hedge, Greenwald and Laine (1996) argue that Hanushek’s 
methodology led to misleading results.  First, aggregate cost data from 1900, when there was 
only a small fraction of the population (mostly in cities and towns) attended secondary school, is 
not comparable to cost data from 1970, when secondary schooling was nearly universally 
available.  Second, comparing aggregate educational achievement of the national population 
across such large time periods is also inappropriate.    
Hedge et al also disagrees with Hanushek’s assertion that if resources are up and 
achievement is down, then those two variables cannot be positively related.  To arrive at this 
conclusion, requires an assumption that everything relevant to the cost of education and the 
production of student achievement remained constant.   In fact, there have been important 
changes over time, including a dramatic expansion in the level and comprehensiveness of 
education and a decline in social capital available in families, which substitute for school 
resources (Hedge and Greenwald, 1996).   They argue that changes in family structures and 
decreasing social capital have increased school expenditures as part of social capital investment.   
One aspect of social capital is the amount of time mothers have to devote to their children 
presumably some of which is given over to informal educative activities.  Therefore, when 
mothers work, social capital is diminished, or shifted.    
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Eberts, Kehoe, and Stone (1984) also find that when the effect of social economic status 
(SES) is taken into account, there is a positive effect of small-scale schooling on student 
achievement.  Controlling for SES is important because poverty is known to have a depressing 
effect on student achievement, and the poverty rate of rural areas is generally high (O’Hare, 
1988).   Friedkin and Necochea (1988) also predicted that school size and district size would 
interact with SES to explain the relationship of organizational scale and student achievement.  
They hypothesized that in low-SES schools and districts, large size would negatively affect 
student achievement, whereas in high-SES schools and districts it would positively affect student 
achievement. 
In addition, to explore the cost-quality relationship, Paul R Mort (in John and Morphet, 
1960, pp.14-16) conducted a number of studies in this area over a period of years.  On the basis 
of those numerous studies, he drew the following conclusions:  
“…….. The quality of education provided in the school systems where expenditures are 
low is far less satisfactory than that in systems where expenditures are above the national 
average.  Low expenditures tend to mean inadequate leadership, large classes, poor 
teachers and teaching, and many other features that contribute to low quality. 
……….Even in the higher expenditure level school systems, there seems to be a strong 
relationship between expenditures and quality of education.  The districts which spend 
more appear generally to contribute more per dollar to individuals and to our national life 
than those who spend less….”    
 
Al Samarrai (2002 in Leclercq, 2005) provides a broader view of the evidence by surveying the 
papers by Hanushek and Kimko (2000), Lee and Barro (2001) along with four earlier studies 
(Colclough and Lewin, 1993; McMahon, 1999; Schultz, 1995; Woessmann, 2000), although no 
definitive conclusion was presented.  He finds that there is no consistent effect of resources on 
educational outcomes.  He argues that studies using internationally comparable test scores tend 
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to show that resources have a statistically significant impact, but the direction of this impact 
differs across the studies.   Odden and Picus (1992, p. 280) argue that there are several reasons 
why education production function research has been relatively unsuccessful in identifying a 
relationship between education resources and student achievement.  First, production function 
research assumes that all school systems are pursuing the same goals, and that those goals are 
related to student achievement.  He insists that the reality is that the school systems pursue a 
variety of goals, and in many cases student achievement may not be the primary goal.   
Second, it is difficult to identify inputs.  They find that many studies of input-outcome 
relationships ignore processes and vary widely on the inputs to be analyzed.  He argues that 
inputs could be reconceptualized to mean the “enacted curriculum” and instructional quality, but 
since production function analysis ignores process, this might not be an acceptable approach for 
a production function.   
Third, the functional relationship among variables itself is hard to determine.  Most 
studies assume a linear relationship, but the linkages might be curvilinear, logarithmic, or 
interactive.  Fourth, he notes that most literature reviews do not distinguish among production 
function studies by unit analysis: districts, schools, classroom or student.  He argues that not only 
is there variation within the unit analysis, but also the size of the unit matters, since positive 
results between resources and achievement are more likely to be found for smaller units.  Finally, 
most studies use cross-sectional rather than longitudinal data and thus cannot analyze “value 
added” as the real issue in relating education to achievement.  Although there is no definite 
conclusion of cost-quality relationship, it is still interesting to see its relationship case by case.   
Some findings in developed countries differ from results found in developing countries.     
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2.2.3 Teacher salary and educational quality 
Hanushek and Rivkin (1990, in Lazear, 2001 p.795) argue that teachers are the most important 
determinants of educational output.  Levin (1970) and Lazear (2001), therefore, suggest that 
teacher quality can be raised by paying higher salaries.  It means that teacher, as part of the labor 
force, can be highly selected by school.   Providing higher salary implies to a larger pool of 
applicants, which permits a school to engage in more selective hiring.   Unfortunately, public 
schools in Indonesia do not have enough power to hire qualified permanent teachers and/or to 
determine teacher salaries.  The assumption of salary-quality relationship is still impossible to 
apply.    
Although under the current decentralized system the district will have a responsibility for 
hiring and paying teachers in public and private schools except those in madrasahs, the central 
government still set the salary levels, promotional and reward systems for the teachers (World 
Bank, 2004).   Districts may provide teachers some supplementary benefits and incentives within 
their jurisdictions, but it is merely due to district economic capabilities and/or high-living-cost 
adjustment.  There are no such rules in providing incentives or “merit-pay” for teachers due to 
their good performances.  Their performances have no impact on their salaries.  Teachers 
therefore become less motivated to improve their performance.  This condition, therefore, may 
impact the quality of education.  Chapman (2002 in Adams, 2002b, p.22) argues that “frequently 
suggested incentives for teachers include: (i) merit pay to motive teachers with significant 
portion of a teacher’s salary based on performance as assessed by supervisors; (ii) salary 
premiums to mathematics and science teachers; and (iii) location premiums to teachers working 
in rural areas”.  In this particular case, Adams (2002b, p.22) argues that “apparent solutions to 
ineffective teaching and learning due to lack of incentives and motivations turn out to be 
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complex because of organizational context.  Teachers who do not receive merit pay may respond 
not by trying harder but rather by reducing their efforts.  And, paying premium salaries to math 
and science teachers may make other teachers angry, frustrated, and bitter”. 
Kingdon (1996 in Leclercq, 2005) also finds the same result for studies of the secondary 
schools of urban North India.  She concludes that existing remuneration schemes are not 
structured so as to motive teachers towards improving their pupils’ achievement.  This result is 
different from a case for the US where she finds that a distinction arises between the relationship 
of teacher pay with the entry of professionals into teaching and its relationship with the 
motivation of teachers once appointed.  Kingdon and Teal (2003 in Leclercq, 2005) estimated 
education production function for government and private schools of the same area in urban 
North India and found that given student characteristics and school resources, private schools 
obtain better academic results.  In contrast to government schools, private schools related teacher 
pay to student achievement. 
Contrasting results have been found in the US.  Rossmiller (2001, in Chaikind and 
Fowler, p. 27) notes that there has been much discussion in the US during the past few years 
regarding teacher compensation practices.  Compensation should reflect what teachers know and 
are able to do rather than the long-established practice of basing pay increments for teachers on 
their years of teaching experience and number of academic credits or degrees they have 
accumulated.  He notes that the success of the National Board for Professional Teaching 
Standard (NBPTS) in US in identifying and certifying teachers who meet high and rigorous 
standards of professional knowledge and practice was an important first step toward basing 
compensation on a teacher’s knowledge and skills.  The Teacher Union Reform Network 
(TURN) in the US has also been actively exploring ways in which teacher compensation can be 
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used to support a school’s strategic goals and its need to improve student performance (Urbanski 
& Erskine, 2001 in  Rossmiller, 2001, p. 27).   TURN recognizes that the single salary schedule 
approach to teacher compensation has neither encouraged nor rewarded productivity in 
elementary and secondary schools. 
2.3 SUMMARY 
Starting with the Indonesian economic crisis in 1997 and followed by the fall of Suharto’s 
regime, there were strong pressures and demands from local authorities to have broader regional 
autonomies and fiscal authorities. This condition pushed the Indonesian government to shift its 
governmental system gradually from a centralized to a fully decentralized system.  Based on 
Regional Governance Law No. 22/1999, most of the authority for the development sectors was 
transferred to local governments, including primary and junior secondary education.  According 
to Education Law 20/2003, the principal responsibilities, authority, and resources for the delivery 
of education are transferred to lower levels of government, while some decision-making power is 
transferred to schools (World Bank, 2004).  Local authorities, which are closer to the schools, 
hopefully can precisely and quickly determine what the schools need. 
Beside political considerations as hidden factors behind the process of decentralization in 
Indonesia, efficiency and effectiveness also became the argument for decentralizing the 
education sector.  Given the heterogeneity of cultures and ethnic groups and the large 
geographical scale of Indonesia, the central government most likely did not have sufficient 
knowledge of all local conditions.   A high cost of delivery of laboratory equipments from the 
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central government to local schools and a long history of poor teacher distribution were 
examples of these inefficiency and ineffectiveness cases. 
Pushing all development sectors to local authorities at one time, rather than in a gradual 
process, however, may increase financial and administrative burdens for ministry authorities.  
The World Bank (2004) commented that Indonesia’s new systems allowed local governments to 
produce the services transferred to them under the decentralization reform were just beginning to 
emerge.  There was, however, no national strategy to encourage or disseminate good practices.  
Insufficiently trained and experienced staff to carry out their new and expanded roles also 
becomes a concern in part due to a lack of in-service support from local universities.   Moreover, 
since the Ministry of Education had no regulatory authority over local districts, the development 
of the education sector was likely to receive less attention compared to other job creating 
development sectors, such as road and building construction.  Referring to the argument of John 
and Morphet (1960) that the increase in quantity and quality of education generally should be 
followed by financial support, disparities in quality of education across districts were thus likely 
to become a new problem in Indonesia.  Adequate financial resources for education, therefore, 
are essential when transferring responsibility for the educational sector to local authorities. 
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3.0  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the following sections: (1) population and sampling, (2) data collection, 
(3) methodology and data analysis.   Population and sampling provides insight to the coverage of 
information collected.  The researcher also introduced such a preliminary study using a sample 
data to support this research.  Data collection describes how and what kind of information was 
collected.  Methodology and data analysis explains the kind of methodology and analysis used to 
answer the research questions based on the information obtained. 
3.2 POPULATION AND SAMPLING 
The current study examined the educational finance for public junior secondary schools at 440 
districts in 33 provinces in Indonesia as shown in Table 3.  The unit of analysis of this current 
study was a district level.  The researcher chose the issue of public junior secondary schools for 
several reasons.  First, in 1993 the Indonesian government launched a national agenda of a nine-
year compulsory basic education program,  which meaning  all  Indonesian  children  would need 
to have at least at primary and secondary  level.   This program is an expansion from the previous 
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Table 3.  Names of Province with its Number of Districts. 
No. Province Number of Districts 
  Kabupaten Kotamadya Total 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33 
DKI Jakarta 
West Java 
Central Java 
Yogyakarta 
East Java 
Banten *
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
North Sumatera 
West Sumatera 
Riau 
Jambi 
South Sumatera  
Lampung 
Bengkulu 
Kep. Bangka Belitung * 
Kep. Riau * 
West Kalimantan 
Central Kalimantan 
South Kalimantan 
East Kalimantan 
North Sulawesi 
Central Sulawesi 
South Sulawesi 
West Sulawesi * 
South East Sulawesi 
Gorontalo * 
Bali 
West Nusa Tenggara 
North Nusa Tenggara 
Maluku 
North Maluku * 
Papua (Irian Jaya) 
West Irian Jaya * 
1 
16 
29 
4 
29 
4 
17 
18 
12 
9 
9 
10 
8 
8 
6 
4 
10 
13 
11 
9 
6 
9 
20 
5 
9 
4 
8 
8 
15 
7 
6 
19 
8 
5 
9 
6 
1 
9 
2 
4 
7 
7 
2 
1 
4 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
4 
3 
1 
3 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
 
6 
25 
35 
5 
38 
6 
21 
25 
19 
11 
10 
14 
10 
9 
7 
6 
12 
14 
13 
13 
9 
10 
23 
5 
10 
5 
9 
9 
16 
8 
8 
20 
9 
 T O T A L 349 91 440 
Source : Department of Home Affair, 2005. 
                                                 
* These provinces are new provinces, which are expansions from some provinces since the decentralized system was 
being implemented.  The expansions are as follows: Banten is from West Java, Bangka Belitung is from Jambi,  
Kep. Riau is from Riau, West Sulawesi is from South Sulawesi, Gorontalo is from North Sulawesi, North Maluku is 
from Maluku, and West Irian Jaya is from Papua.  Since these provinces are still new, then some of their data or 
information may still integrate into their previous provinces.  The name of provinces is based on the minister of 
home affair’s decision no. 18, 2005, which can be retrieved from http://www.depdagri.go.id/ 
konten.php?nama=DataWilayah. 
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six-year to a nine-year basic education. The local governments, therefore, were urged to 
accelerate this program.  Since the gross enrollment rates at junior secondary schools were still 
lower than those at primary schools, the government tends to concentrate on junior secondary 
schools.  The current study, therefore, focused on junior secondary schools (JSS). 
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Figure 5.  Financial Sources for JSS at each Category by Type of School in 2002/03 at 62 Districts 
 
Second, the government still gives a priority on financing the public schools. The public 
schools, therefore, are highly dependent on government funds.  These facts are based on a 
preliminary study done by the researcher to identify financial sources for junior secondary 
schools in 2002/03 at 62 districts3 in 8 provinces: Central Java, Yogyakarta, Bali, North 
Sumatera, Bengkulu, West Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, and Gorontalo.  Figure 5 illustrates that 
                                                 
3 The available 2002/03 districts educational data at MONE was only from 62 districts when the preliminary study 
was carried out in 2004.   
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educational funds for junior secondary education provided by the central, province, and district 
authorities were mostly allocated for public schools, compared to those for private schools.   In 
addition, Figure 6 shows that around 82.78 percent of public school financial sources was from 
the government (the central, province, and district authorities). 
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Figure 6.  Financial Sources for JSS by Type of School in 2002/03 at 62 Districts 
 
The researcher also realized that many factors might influence the disparities in 
educational expenditures across the districts.  Some variables related to demographic, geographic 
and socio-economic of the districts, therefore, were also collected.  
3.3 DATA COLLECTION 
One of the objectives of the current study was to explore the impact of a decentralized system on 
changes in disparities in educational expenditures.  For comparison purposes, the researcher 
collected data of 1999/00 and 2002/03.  Year 1999/00 is the last year when the centralized 
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system was carried out, and 2002/03 is the current available data since the decentralized system 
was implemented.    
 In the process of data collection, the researcher visited the Center of Informatics at the 
Ministry of National Education (MONE) to get educational data, and the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (BPS) to acquire socio-economic and demographic data.  In order to have this 
information, the researcher filed a special request to MONE and BPS to have access to the data.   
First, the researcher visited the library at each office to look for possible data in published books.  
In order to have further information about the data, the researcher contacted and met directly 
with the person in charge who was responsible for the data publishing at each office.   
To analyze the educational finances at public junior secondary schools, the researcher 
collected information by district on school expenditures, number of students, Gross Enrollment 
Rates, and National Examination Scores (NES).  School expenditures consist of expenditures for 
teachers’ salaries, non-teachers’ salaries, teaching-learning, procurement, extracurricular, 
maintenance, rehabilitation, services, and administration.  In this study, the researcher grouped 
those expenditures into the following categories: teachers’ salaries (consisting of salaries only for 
teachers), teaching-learning process (consisting of expenditures for teaching-learning, 
procurement, and extracurricular), maintenance & rehabilitation (consisting of expenditures for 
maintenance and rehabilitation), and others (the rest of expenditures).  For a comparison 
purposes, expenditures per student were also calculated.  Information of Gross enrollment rates 
was also collected to portray how far the nine-year compulsory basic education program has 
been reached by the district and how it relates to district’s educational fund allocation.    
To measure the quality of education, an average national examination scores (NES) from 
all subject matters was calculated for each district.  Concerning the NES standardization across 
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the districts in Indonesia, the MONE through the Center of National Examination develops an 
item test bank.  In order to prevent a risk of test leakage, the MONE provides each province with 
three different test packages for each subject matter with a degree of equivalent difficulty.  The 
province will distribute the packages to the districts randomly.  The three different but equivalent 
difficulty test packages also have a function as an inter-changeable test.  One package can 
replace other packages in case a test leaks.  In order to prevent such a personal interest or a 
personal bias in scoring, the schools within a district carry out an inter-change scoring across the 
same level of schools.  Schools within a district, then, do a cross evaluation of students’ test 
sheets.  
Other factors, including demographic, geographic, and socio-economic data of the 
districts, were also collected.  The demographic data provides information regarding a total area, 
a total population and the density of the district.  Information of district types was also recorded.  
There are two types of district: Kabupaten (a rural area) and Kota (an urban area).  In general, 
the Kota has a smaller area, but is more developed and populated than the Kabupaten.    The 
capital city of a province, therefore, is located in the Kota.   The researcher argues that different 
types of districts could impact on the way that districts allocate their budget for the education 
sector.  
To reflect on the level of economic development of the district, the researcher included 
information about Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) per capita.  The researcher 
assumed that a district with a low GRDP per capita reflects a poor district, and conversely a 
district with a high GRDP reflects affluent district.  Since the decentralized system gives the 
districts more power to allocate the money, the districts with higher GRDP per capita are more 
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likely to have more opportunities to support their education sector development by providing 
more funding for education.  
3.4 METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS 
The type of information collected in the current study was continuous and categorical data.  To 
analyze this information, the researcher used quantitative analysis.  To answer the research 
questions, the researcher used Lotus 123 and SAS programs to produce graphs and statistical 
analysis.  
To answer research question 1 “What characteristics of disparities in education 
expenditures occurred across the districts?”, the researcher provided graphs and calculated the 
coefficients of variance (CVs).  The graphs aim to show patterns of education expenditures per 
student across districts.  The coefficient of variation was used to measure the magnitude of the 
disparity.  This coefficient reflects a degree to which a set of data points varies or expresses the 
standard deviation as a percentage of the mean.  The minimum value of CV is zero, meaning that 
the data is homogeneous.  The larger this number, the greater variability exists in the data.  One 
advantage of using the CV over a standard deviation in measuring the variability is that the CV 
expresses a variation relative to the size of the observations being summarized (Korin, 1975, p. 
66).  The CV, therefore, is also called a relative standard deviation.  The CV is a very useful tool 
when comparing variability between different sets of data.    
To portray the magnitude of the disparities, the CVs for the districts across the country, 
within the province, and across the regions were also calculated.  The researcher argues that 
since the decentralized system gives the local authorities more power to allocate the budget 
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across their development sectors, then the disparities in education expenditures in 2002/03 might 
increase.  One local authority may have a different priority on its development sector than other 
local authorities. 
  
Formula:    CV = (s / x) * 100                   
Where, CV = coefficient of variance,  
s = a standard deviation of education expenditures per student,  
and x = a mean of educational expenditures per student. 
 
An ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis was used to answer research question 
2: “How do geographic, demographic and socio-economic conditions of districts impact the 
disparities in education expenditures?”, hence identifying the factors that influence the education 
expenditures per student.  The regression equation uses six independent variables to explain 
variations in the educational expenditures.   
The equation is as follows: 
 EXPi = α + β1 Reg1i + β2 Reg2i + β3 Reg3i + β4 Reg4i + β5 TYPEi +  β6 DENSITYi  
              + β7 GERi +  β8 GRDPi + β9 DAUi + εi;   i = number of the districts, 
 
where EXP is an education expenditure per student, Reg1-Reg4 are dummy variables 
representing the regional codes, TYPE is a type of districts which is coded as 1 for Kota and 0 
for Kabupaten, DENSITY is a density of a district population, GER is a gross enrollment rate at 
district’s public junior secondary schools, GRDP is a Gross Regional Domestic Product per 
capita, and DAU is a general allocation fund per capita.  The codes for the dummy variables are 
as follows: Reg1 for Java and Bali region, Reg2 for Sumatera region, Reg3 for Kalimantan 
region, and Reg4 for Sulawesi region.   
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In analyzing the impact of the disparities in education expenditures on student 
achievement as stated in research question 3: “Do the disparities in education expenditures 
matter for student achievement?”, national examination scores were recorded.  Referring to the 
literatures, however, there was no consistent conclusion in determining a relationship between 
expenditures and the quality of education.  Hanushek argued that there was no connection 
between them, but Hedges and Greenwald (1996); Lee and Barro (2001); and Wendling and 
Cohen (1981) argued that there was a high relationship between education resources and student 
achievement.   
In this case, the researcher hypothesized that there should be a significantly positive 
relationship between the expenditures and achievement as measured by test scores.  Many factors 
might contribute into performing the quality of education.  It was not only the total amount of 
money allocated into education, but also how the money used effectively.  Other factors such as 
teachers’ salaries, teacher-student ratio, and class size might also give such contributions.   The 
researcher, therefore, explored the relationship of the quality of education, represented by student 
achievement, with expenditures and other factors previously mentioned.  An Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression analysis was used to explore this relationship.  The regression equation 
uses 7 independent variables to explain variations in student achievement.   
The equation is as follows: 
 
NESi = α + β1 Reg1i + β2 Reg2i + β3 Reg3i + β4 Reg4i + β5 TYPE i + β6 RATIO i +β7 SIZE i  
     + β8 SALARY i + β9 TEACHING i + β10 MAINT i + εi  ;  i = number of the districts, 
 
 where NES is a district’s national examination score, Reg1-Reg4 are dummy variables 
representing the regional codes, TYPE is a type of the district which is coded as 1 for Kota and 0 
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for Kabupaten, SALARY is an average of teachers’ salaries, TEACHING is expenditures for 
teaching and learning process per student, MAINT is expenditures for rehabilitation and 
maintenance per student, RATIO is a ratio of student-teacher, SIZE is number of students in a 
class.    
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4.0  RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the obstacles faced by the researcher during data 
collection, which impacted the number of observations able to be collected.  It will, then be 
followed by a discussion of the study findings.  
4.2 DATA COLLECTION 
During data collection, the researcher was able to obtain information from 288 districts on 
1999/00 data (86.49 % of the 333 total districts in 1999/00) and 236 districts on 2002/03 data 
(53.64%4 of the 440 total districts in 2002/03).  These data can be seen in Appendix A and B.  
The researcher was unable to collect information from all districts for the following reasons:   
1. Under the decentralized system, districts or sub-districts were permitted to either join or 
to establish a new province or district; therefore, the number of provinces and districts 
increased in 2002/03.   In 1999/00, there were 26 provinces with 333 districts.  This 
                                                 
4 The researcher argues that the percentage of the collected data of 2002/03 was actually higher than 53.64%.  It 
occurred as the result of the statistical data of the new districts being counted under that of their previous districts.  
The researcher estimated that the actual data collected for 2002/03 might be closer to 71% (referred to the number of 
districts in 1999/00). 
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number increased in 2002/03 to 33 provinces and 440 districts.  The statistical 
information of several new districts or provinces, however, was still being counted under 
previous province/district information.  These new districts had not established a data 
collection system yet.    
2. During the data collection, the researcher was unable to collect information from all 
districts.  Some districts did not submit their statistical data to BPS or MONE, and some 
other districts did not provide the required financial information. The data, therefore, 
were incomplete.  The districts with incomplete information were dropped from the 
study.  The missing information could not be collected separately because there was little 
enforcement by MONE to generate a more complete data set. 
4.3 STUDY FINDINGS 
4.3.1 Disparities in Education Expenditures per Student 
To answer research question 1: “What characteristics of  disparities in education expenditures 
per students occurred across districts?”, the researcher compared the data of 1999/00 and 
2002/03, retaining the same name and number of districts for both 1999/00 and 2002/03.  In this 
way, the researcher was able to match 185 districts for both the 1999/00 and the 2003/03 data 
(see Appendix C).   Based on normal probability plots (see Appendix D), the researcher found 
four outliers5: two in 1999/00 and two in 2002/03 data.    After removing these outliers, the 
                                                 
5 An outlier is defined as an observation lying outside the range of the rest of the observation (Studenmund, 1997, p. 
73). 
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researcher used 181 districts which were grouped into 5 regions: (a) region 1:  all districts in Java 
and Bali; (b) region 2: all districts in Sumatera; (c) region 3: all districts in Kalimantan;  (d) 
region 4: all districts in Sulawesi; and (e) region 5: Other districts.  For each region, the 
researcher calculated the disparity in education expenditures per student.  The number of districts 
in each region is shown in Table 4.      
 
Table 4.  Number of Districts within the Regions 
Region Number of Districts Number of Districts by Type 
 1999/00 
(reference) 
Completed6 % Type 1999/00 
(reference) 
Completed5 % 
Java-Bali 116 89 76.72 Kota 26 16 61.54 
    Kab 90 72 80.00 
Sumatera 95 47 49.47 Kota 22 15 68.18 
    Kab 73 32 43.84 
Kalimantan 38 15 39.47 Kota 8 2 25.00 
    Kab 30 13 43.33 
Sulawesi 44 20 45.45 Kota 6 3 50.00 
    Kab 38 17 44.73 
Others 35 10 28.57 Kota 5 0 0.00 
    Kab 35 10 28.57 
Total 333 181 54.35 Kota 67 36 53.73 
    Kab 266 144 54.14 
4.3.1.1  Disparities in Education Expenditures per Student across Districts, among and 
within Regions. 
 
To measure the magnitude of the disparities in education expenditures per student, the researcher 
calculated means and coefficients of variance (CV) of education expenditures per student in 
                                                 
6 Completed data is collected data which was then corrected by eliminating the outliers and retaining the same name 
and number of districts in 1999/00 and 2002/03.   
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1999/00 and 2002/03 across districts, among and within regions.   The researcher used the data 
of 2002/03, which was corrected for an inflation factor of about 30 percent during 1999/00-
2002/03.   
  
Table 5.  Mean and Coefficient of Variance (CV) of Education Expenditures per Students across Districts, 
among and within Regions in 1999/00 and 2002/03. 
 Mean (in Rp.000/year) CV 
 1999/00 2002/03 diff 1999/00 2002/03 Diff 
Across Districts 396.60 660.93 264.33 32.23 42.13 9.89 
Among Region 416.15 689.00 272.85 19.77 18.76 -1.02 
Within Region 
 - Java-Bali 
 - Sumatera 
 - Kalimantan 
 - Sulawesi 
 - Other 
 
365.36 
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Figure 7.  Disparities in Education Expenditures per Student across Districts in 1999/00 and 2002/03 
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Table 5 shows that education expenditures per student across districts increased by Rp. 
264,330/year; expenditures increased from Rp. 396,600/year in 1999/00 to Rp. 660,930/year in 
2002/03.   Such a significant increase in education expenditures per student indicated that the 
fiscal capacity for education increased. Table 5 also illustrates that a disparity in education 
expenditures per student across districts increased from 32.23 in 1999/00 to 42.13 in 2002/03.  
Increasing the disparity in education expenditures per student, however, indicates that an 
imbalance in fiscal capacities for education across districts most likely increased.   Figure 7 
shows the pattern of the disparity in education expenditures per student in both 1999/00 and 
2002/03.  Some districts had lower abilities; while other districts had higher abilities to increase 
them.  Districts with high education expenditures per student in 1999/00 most likely retained 
high expenditures in 2002/03; sometimes expenditures were even higher relative to other 
districts.   
To portray the efforts to increase regional fiscal capacities, the researcher also calculated 
mean differences in education expenditures per student across regions.  Table 5 shows that 
education expenditures per student for each region increased in 2002/03.  Sulawesi region had 
the largest education expenditure per student (Rp. 840,410/year), which means that the Sulawesi 
region had the largest fiscal capacity for education.   Meanwhile, Kalimantan region had the 
largest mean difference in education expenditures per student (Rp. 363,290/year), which means 
that the Kalimantan region made the greatest effort to increase the fiscal capacity for education.   
Table 5 also shows that disparities in education expenditures per student among the 
regions decreased slightly from 19.77 in 1999/00 to 18.76 in 2002/03, whereas disparities within 
regions tended to increase.  An increase in disparities indicates that imbalance in fiscal capacities  
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Figure 8.  Disparities in Education Expenditures per Student within Regions 
 
for education at each region increased.  Compared to the disparity in education expenditures per 
student across districts in 2002/03, which was about 42.13, the Java-Bali region had a relatively 
low disparity (33.93).   This illustrates that the Java-Bali region had relatively more balanced 
fiscal capacities for education across the districts.  In contrast, the imbalances in fiscal capacities 
  58
for education in Sumatera, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi region tended to be high.  The Kalimantan 
region had the highest disparity (51.37).  A larger disparity in education expenditures per student 
indicates a greater imbalance in fiscal capacities for education across districts within the region.  
Kalimantan region also had the largest incremental disparity in education expenditures per 
student, an increase of 14.87.  This means that the Kalimantan region tended to have a greater 
imbalance in the ability to increase fiscal capacities across its districts.  Figure 8 shows that some 
districts in the Kalimantan region had higher capacities for education relative to other districts in 
this region.   Another region (consisting of Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua), however, had 
the lowest disparity, even slightly decreasing in 2002/03, which indicating that districts in Nusa 
Tenggara, Maluku and Papua had relatively more balanced fiscal capacities for education. 
4.3.1.2 Disparities in Education Expenditures per Student based on Type of Districts 
There are two types of districts in Indonesia: a) Kota (an urban area) and b) Kabupaten (a rural 
area).  In general a Kota is more developed and populous than a Kabupaten.    Table 6 shows that 
in 2002/03 the Kota posted larger education expenditures per student than did Kabupaten (Rp. 
695,830/year vs Rp. 651,960/year).  The Kota also posted a larger mean difference 
(Rp.289,900/year).  This illustrates both Kota’s larger fiscal capacity for education as well as its 
greater effort to increase the fiscal capacity for education.   
Increasing the fiscal capacity, however, may lead to increasing the disparity in education 
expenditures.   Table 7 shows that disparities in education expenditures per student across 
districts for both Kota and Kabupaten increased in 2002/03.   Kabupaten showed larger 
disparities in both 1999/00 and 2002/03, but the increment of disparity was lower (9.86).   This 
means that, although in 2002/03 the Kabupaten still had a larger imbalance in fiscal capacities 
for education across the districts, the ability to increase the fiscal capacity for education in each 
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district was relatively equal.  As a result, the Kabupaten had a relatively low increment in fiscal 
capacities for education (see Table 6).   In contrast, the Kota showed a lower disparity than the 
Kabupaten, but revealed a larger increment of disparity (11.12).  This means, in 2002/03, the 
Kota still had a relatively smaller imbalance in fiscal capacities for education across the districts, 
but some of the Kota-districts had larger abilities to increase their fiscal capacity for education 
(see Figure 9; some districts in Kota posted higher education expenditures per student).   As a 
result, the Kota had a relatively larger increment in fiscal capacities for education (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6.  Means and Mean Differences of Education Expenditures per Student in 1999/00 and 2002/03 (in 
Rp.000/year) based on Type of Districts. 
Type of Year Across Within Regions 
District  Districts Java-Bali Sumatera Kalimantan Sulawesi Other 
Kota 1999/00 405.93 400.93 413.87 352.63 430.04 - 
 2002/03 695.83 
(289.90) 
670.04 
(269.11) 
733.48 
(319.61) 
519.57 
(166.94) 
771.29 
(341.25) 
- 
Kab 1999/00 394.20 356.96 379.32 457.62 565.64 336.13 
 2002/03 
651.96 
(257.76) 
610.55 
(253.59) 
593.36 
(214.04) 
851.12 
(393.50) 
852.60 
(286.96) 
537.68 
(201.55) 
Note : The italic number inside the parentheses is a mean difference between mean in 1999/00 and  2002/03 
 
Table 7. Coefficients of variance (CV) and CV differences in Education Expenditures per Student in 1999/00 
and 2002/03  based on Type of Districts 
 
Type of Year Across Among Within Regions 
District  Districts Regions Java-Bali Sumatera Kalimantan Sulawesi Other 
Kota 1999/00 22.35 8.35 24.01 22.71 5.11 20.32 - 
 2002/03 33.47 
(11.12) 
16.46 
(8.10) 
41.56 
(17.55) 
27.24 
(4.53) 
13.26 
(8.15) 
17.62 
(-2.70) 
- 
Kab 1999/00 34.47 22.41 25.76 35.36 37.20 27.53 23.26 
 2002/03 
44.33 
(9.86) 
21.92 
(-0.49) 
31.51 
(5.75) 
53.37 
(18.02) 
50.43 
(13.23) 
44.59 
(17.06) 
21.65 
(-1.61) 
Note : The italic number inside the parentheses is a CV difference between CV in 1999/00 and  2002/03 
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Figure 9.  Disparities in Education Expenditures per Student at Kota and Kabupaten in 1999/00 and 2002/03 
 
In addition, as shown in Table 5, the disparities in education expenditures per student 
within each region revealed greater differences than those among the regions.  The figures in 
Table 8 may be able to explain why this phenomenon occurred.  Table 8 shows that, in 2002/03, 
the gap  of  fiscal capacities for  education  between  the  Kota  and  the Kabupaten in  Java-Bali,  
 
Table 8.  Gaps (Mean Differences) of Education Expenditures per Student in 1999/00 and in 2002/03 (in 
Rp.000/year) based on Type of Districts 
Year Type of  Across Within Regions  
 
 
District Districts Java-Bali Sumatera Kalimantan Sulawesi Other 
1999/00 Kota 405.93 400.93 413.87 352.63 430.04 - 
 Kab 394.20 356.96 379.32 457.62 565.64 336.13 
 
 
Gap (11.73) (43.97) (34.55) (-104.99) (-135.60) 
- 
2002/03 Kota 695.83 670.04 733.48 519.57 771.29 - 
 Kab 651.96 610.55 593.36 851.12 852.60 537.68 
 
 
Gap (43.87) (59.49) (140.12) (-331.55) (-81.31) - 
Note : The italic number inside the parentheses is a gap of education expenditures per student between Kota and 
Kabupaten at each region in 1999/00 and  2002/03. 
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Sumatera, and Kalimantan region increased, but those in Sulawesi region decreased.  The 
increments of fiscal capacities for education in the Kota in the Java-Bali, Sumatera, and Sulawesi 
regions were relatively higher than those at Kabupaten (see Table 6).  This means, Kota in these 
regions had relatively experienced better fiscal capacities for education than did the Kabupaten. 
In 2002/03, the Kota in the Sumatera and Sulawesi regions appeared to have larger 
increments in fiscal capacities for education.  Table 6 shows that the Kota in the Sumatera region 
increased the fiscal capacity for education by Rp. 319,610/year, compared to the Kabupaten 
increase of 214,040/year.  And, the Kota in the Sulawesi region increased the fiscal capacity for 
education by Rp. 341,250/year, compared to the Kabupaten increase of 286,960/year.  These 
phenomena, however, provided different results.  Table 8 shows that better fiscal capacity for 
education at the Kota in Sumatera region succeeded only in widening the gap of fiscal capacities 
for education between the Kota and Kabupaten.  An inverse result, however, occurred in the 
Sulawesi region: Increasing fiscal capacities for education in the Kota in the Sulawesi region 
reduced the gap of fiscal capacities for education between the Kota and Kabupaten.  This 
indicates that the efforts made to increase the fiscal capacities for education in the Kota in the 
Sulawesi region were much more successful.  
The ability to increase fiscal capacities for education between the Kota and the 
Kabupaten in Java-Bali region relatively did not effect much change.  As shown in Table 8, in 
2002/03, the Java-Bali region posted the lowest gap in education expenditures per student 
between the Kota and Kabupaten.  As a result, the disparity in education expenditures per student 
in the Java-Bali region in 2002/03 did increase. This increase was relatively small (8.23; see 
Table 5).  On the other hand, Table 6 shows that the Kalimantan region showed a larger 
increment of education expenditures per student in the Kabupaten not in the Kota.  This indicates 
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that the Kabupaten in the Kalimantan region showed a better fiscal capacity for education (a Rp. 
393,500/year increase) than did the Kota (a Rp. 166,940/year increase).  However, this larger gap 
in the fiscal capacities for education between the Kota and Kabupaten in the Kalimantan region 
(about Rp.331,550/year) only resulted in increasing the disparity in education expenditures per 
student across districts: Kalimantan region posted the largest imbalance in fiscal capacities for 
education across districts (about 51.37; see Table 5). 
4.3.2 Factors that impact Disparities in Education Expenditures 
After recognizing the increasing disparities in education expenditures per student across districts, 
an exploration of the factors possibly impacting increasing disparities in education expenditures 
per student will prove very interesting.  Based on Parrish, Matsumo and Fowler’s argument (see 
Chapter 2, p.28), the researcher also argued that geographic, demographic, and socio-economic 
characteristics of the districts in Indonesia might impact the way in which the district allocate the 
budget for education, and perhaps lead to increasing disparities in education expenditures across 
districts.   The researcher, therefore, developed research question 2: “How do geographic, 
demographic, and socio-economic factors impact the disparities in education expenditures per 
student?”. 
To answer research question 2, the researcher developed an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
Regression analysis using the data of 2002/03, which consisted of 236 districts (70.87% 
collected; compared to the number of districts in 1999/00).  The districts’ education expenditures 
per student were established as a dependent variable, and the following variables were used as 
independent variables: (a) a demographic factor, consisting of a density and a junior secondary 
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gross enrollment rate, (b) a geographic factor, consisting of a region and a type of the district, 
and (c) a socio-economic factor, consisting of a GRDP per capita and a DAU per capita.   
During the analysis, the factor of density had a high correlation to the types of districts 
(r=0.7), indicating that the Kota tends to be more populous than the Kabupaten.   Therefore, in 
order to eliminate a multicollinearity7 problem in the regression analysis, the variable of density 
was excluded from the analysis and the variable of district type was incorporated into the 
analysis.    Based on the Ordinary Least Square Regression Analysis, a plot of residuals against 
predicted values shown in Figure 10 was provided.   This plot shows that some observations had 
extremely high residual, indicating  that there  were  some outliers  found in the analysis.   These   
JExp_STD = 68. 046 +489. 01 Reg1 +413. 11 Reg2 +788. 26 Reg3 +621. 6 Reg4 -3. 8211 Type +6. 3017 GRDP_Cap +0. 3798 DAU_Cap
+1. 6542 GER
N     
236   
Rsq   
0. 0870
Adj Rsq
0. 0548
RMSE  
732. 95
-2000
-1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
Predi ct ed Val ue
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
 
Figure 10.  A plot between residuals and predicted values of education expenditures per student to show 
existing outliers in the analysis 
 
                                                 
7 A multicollinearity is a violation of the regression assumption that no independent variable is a linear function of 
one or more other independent variables (Studenmund, 1997, p. 259).  This problem can be corrected by excluding 
one of the collinear variables from the equation. 
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outliers could indicate that some districts might have outstanding education budget allocations, 
or that specific circumstances explaining such high education expenditures per student at the 
district levels.  This situation, of course, requires further analysis in the future.  In the current 
study, the researcher focused only on exploring general phenomena that exist in the field.  The 
researcher, therefore, used a robust regression analysis instead of an OLS regression analysis. 
 
Table 9.  Parameter Estimates on Predicting Districts' Education Expenditures per Student 
Variable Df Parameter 
Estimate 
Chi-Sq p-value 
Intercept 
Reg1 
Reg2 
Reg3 
Reg4 
Type 
GRDP per Cap 
DAU per Cap 
GER 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
95.236
309.200
216.793
205.411
398.706
 135.028
-0.006
0.167
3.453
0.22
14.79
 7.27
4.96
22.21
 7.35
 4.24
 6.60
3.94
0.6363
0.0001
0.0070
0.0259
<.0001
0.0067
0.0395
0.0102
 0.0472
 
 R-square = 0.28. 
 
Table 10.  A Chow Test of Regionalism on Districts' Education Expenditures per Student 
Source df Mean Square F-value p-value 
Numerator 
Denominator 
4 
207 
481,001
 77,348
6.22 <0.001
 
A robust regression is an important tool for analyzing data that are contaminated with 
outliers (Chen, 2002).  He argues that the robust regression provides resistant (stable) results in 
the presence of outliers.  In completing this analysis, the researcher used a Robustreg procedure 
with a Least Trimmed Squares (LTS) estimation method provided by SAS 9.1.   The robust 
regression analysis result is shown in Table 9.  For the first step, the researcher was trying to 
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recognize whether there was a structural change of the regression model across regions.  To 
acquire this information, a Chow test8 was conducted.  For the current study, the Chow test 
result, shown in Table 10, indicates that at a 95 percent confidence interval (α=0.05) a structural 
change of the regression model occurred across the regions.  It also means that geographic region 
has significant impact on education expenditures per student9.  The researcher, therefore, 
examined the impact of independent variables (type of district, GRDP per capita, DAU per capita 
and gross enrolment rates) on education expenditures per student in each region.    
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Figure 11.  Box-plot of Education Expenditures per Student at each Region 
 
Figure 11 shows the data distribution of education expenditures per student for each 
district, and illustrates that some extreme observations or possible outliers existed for some 
                                                 
8 A Chow test particularly examines structural change; it is an econometric test that determines whether the 
coefficients in a regression model are the same in separate sub-samples.  When the Chow test indicates rejecting the 
null hypothesis that no structural change in the regression model exists, then treating the data as different sub-
samples is more appropriate than assuming that the same model parameters apply equally to the groups.   
 
9 This finding was also in line with Parris, Matsumo, and Fowler’s finding in the US.  They identified that school 
district spending in the US substantially varied by geographic region (see Chapter 2 p.28). 
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regions.  Then, instead of using an OLS regression analysis for each region, a robust regression 
analysis was used.  However, the robust regression analysis proved applicably only to the Java-
Bali and the Sumatera region data.  The results are shown in Table 11.   A linear regression 
analysis was, unfortunately, inappropriate for Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Other10 region data.  
This could occur as a result of an inadequate number of observations collected from each of 
those regions to run a linear regression analysis or because no linear relationship exists between 
the education expenditures per student and the independent variables.  Further or specific 
analysis for those regions is needed. 
 
Table 11.  Parameter Estimates on Predicting Districts’ Education Expenditures per Student at Java-Bali and 
Sumatera Region 
Region Source df Estimate Chi-
Square 
p-value R-square 
Java-Bali Intercept 
Type 
GER 
GRDP per Cap 
DAU per Cap 
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
531.769
-6.999
 1.708
-0.004
0.344
7.24
0.01
0.84
0.43
 4.83
0.007
0.924
0.360
0.513
0.028
0.25 
Sumatera Intercept 
Type 
GER 
GRDP per Cap 
DAU per Cap 
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
653.185
 203.143
-1.947
0.003
0.509
 3.32
 8.15
0.35
0.79
27.45
0.068
0.004
0.554
0.373
<0.000
0.37 
  
Table 11 shows that at a 95 percent confidence interval (α=0.05) the general allocation 
fund (DAU) per capita had a statistically significant impact on education expenditures per 
student in both the Java-Bali and the Sumatera regions. The parameter estimation of the DAU 
per capita for the Sumatera region (0.509) was larger than that for the Java-Bali region (0.344), 
                                                 
10 Other region consists of  West and East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, and Papua provinces.   
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indicating that the DAU per capita for the Sumatera region tended to cause a stronger impact on 
education expenditures per student.   Its positive sign of parameter estimation indicates that 
districts with larger DAU per capita are those also most likely to have larger education 
expenditures per student.   
The significance of DAU per capita indicates that districts in the Java-Bali and the 
Sumatera region appear to have a high dependency on an intergovernmental transfer through the 
DAU to support education sector development, a theory that falls in line with the Brodjonegoro’s 
argument (2004) that local governments would have a higher dependency on the DAU (see 
Chapter 2, p.25).  This high dependency on the DAU is also strengthened by the finding that the 
GRDP percapita in both regions had no statistically significant impact on education expenditures 
per student, indicating that local authorities may have no significant support for education sector 
development.  The richer of such districts (the districts with higher GRDP per capita) did not 
necessarily mean a greater allocation of funding for education. 
Table 11 also shows that a different type of district in the Sumatera region seemed to 
provide a significant impact on the way in which districts allocated education funding. A positive 
sign of parameter estimation of the district type indicated that the Kota in the Sumatera region 
tended to have a larger allocation for education than did the Kabupaten.  This result was quite 
similar to the preliminary finding provided by Research Question 1, in which the Kota in 
Sumatera region had larger education expenditures per student than did the Kabupaten.   In 
contrast, there was no statistically significant different for education expenditures per student 
between Kota and Kabupaten in the Java-Bali region.   This condition may also explain why in 
2002/03 the Java-Bali region had a lower disparity in education expenditures per student than did 
the Sumatera region (see Table 5).   
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In addition, the central government enforcement that districts should support the nine-
year compulsory basic education program still appeared to be ineffective in the Java-Bali and the 
Sumatera regions.  At a 95 percent confidence interval (α=0.05), the junior secondary gross 
enrollment rates (GER) in both the Java-Bali and the Sumatera region had no statistically 
significant impact on education expenditures per student.  Districts with larger gross enrollment 
rates do not always indicate a greater allocation of funding for education.     
4.3.3 Disparities in Education Expenditures and Educational Quality 
After identifying the existing disparities in education expenditures and the possible factors 
influencing those disparities, the researcher explored the impact of the education expenditure 
disparities on educational quality, and formulated Research Question 3: “Do the disparities in 
education expenditures impact student achievement?”.  In the current study, the educational 
quality was represented by the student achievement measured by national examination scores 
(NES).  To answer this question, the researcher developed an OLS regression analysis using the 
data from 2002/03.  The education expenditures were grouped into expenditures for teachers’ 
salaries, school maintenance and rehabilitation, and the teaching-learning process (see Chapter 3 
p. 46).  During the analysis, however, the expenditures for school maintenance and rehabilitation 
seemed to have high correlation with the expenditures for the teaching-learning process (r=0.74).  
In order to eliminate a multicollinearity problem (see p. 63), the expenditure for school 
maintenance and rehabilitation were excluded from the analysis and the expenditure for the 
teaching-learning process were included as part of the analysis.  By plotting the residuals and the 
predicted values, as shown in Figure 12, the researcher found observations that had high 
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residuals, indicating the presence of outliers in the analysis.  To resolve the problem, a robust 
regression analysis was used (see p. 62).   
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Figure 12.  A Plot between residual and predicted value of national examination scores to show existing 
outliers in the analysis 
 
Table 12 shows the robust regression result.  First, the researcher used a Chow test to 
analyze whether a significant difference in national examination scores existed across the 
regions.  The Chow test (see Table 13) indicated that at a 95 percent confidence interval (α=0.05) 
a structural change of national examination scores across the regions was found, suggesting that 
treating the data as different sub-samples would be more appropriate than assuming parameters 
of the same model would apply equally to all the groups.  The data for each region was analyzed.  
Figure 12 shows a data distribution of national examination scores for each region with a median  
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Table 12.  Parameter Estimations on predicting National Examination Scores 
Variable df Parameter 
Estimate 
Chi-Sq p-value | 
Intercept 
Reg1 
Reg2 
Reg3 
Reg4 
Type 
Ratio 
Size 
Salary 
Teaching 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4.577
0.888
0.368
-0.056
0.228
0.427
-0.027
0.006
0.000
-0.001
71.64
29.65
4.75
0.08
1.50
14.77
2.67
0.13
2.56
4.22
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.0294
0.7823
0.2205
0.0001
0.1023
0.7183
0.1093
0.0399
R-square = 0.46 
Table 13.  A Chow test of Regionalism on National Examination Scores 
Source df Mean Square F-value p-value 
Numerator 
Denominator 
4 
195 
4.722
 0.343
13.77 <0.001
 
(Q2) of national examination scores for each region.  Because the median as the middle of a 
distribution is less sensitive to extreme scores than the mean, thus making the median a better 
measurement of a highly skewed distribution.  The Box-plots in Figure 13 show that the Java-
Bali region had the highest median of national examination scores (5.07), while the Kalimantan 
region had the lowest (4.07).  The medians of the national examination scores for other regions 
were as follows: 4.64 in Sumatera, 4.52 in Sulawesi, and 4.11 in Other.       
Figure 13 also shows that several extreme observations or possible outliers in the regions 
exist.  To eliminate such possible outliers, the researcher used a robust regression analysis rather 
than an OLS regression analysis.  The robust regression analysis, however, was only able to be 
applied to the data of the Java-Bali, and the Sumatera regions.  Because of either an 
inappropriate linear model or an inadequate number of observations needed to run a regression 
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analysis, the analysis was not able to apply to data of Kalimantan, Sulawesi and other regions. 
The results of the Java-Bali and the Sumatera regions are shown in Table 14. 
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Figure 13.  Box-plot of  National Examination Scores for each Region. 
 
Table 14.  Parameter of Estimation on national Examination Scores at Java-Bali and Sumatera Region 
Region Source df Estimate Chi-
Square 
p-value R-square 
Java-Bali Intercept 
Type 
Ratio  
Size 
Salary 
Teaching 
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
5.519
0.234
-0.009
-0.020
0.000
0.004
109.42
8.67
0.61
1.79
1.63
9.11
<0.0001
0.0032
0.4336
0.1812
0.2023
0.0025
0.47 
Sumatera Intercept 
Type 
Ratio  
Size 
Salary 
Teaching 
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
4.485
-0.068
-0.087
0.033
0.000
-0.003
14.02
0.08
4.12
0.81
1.49
4.25
 0.0002
0.7756
0.0424
0.3679
0.2223
0.0392
0.37 
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Table 14 shows that at a 95 percent confidence interval, the type of district and budget for 
the teaching-learning process had a statistically significant impact on the national examination 
scores in Java-Bali region.  A positive sign of a parameter estimation of the district type 
indicated that Kota tended to have better national examination scores than did Kabupaten.  A 
positive sign of a parameter estimation of teaching indicates that allocating more funding for the 
teaching learning process would increase the national examination scores in the Java-Bali region.  
Factors such as student-teacher ratio, class size, and teachers’ salaries had no statistically 
significant impact on national examination scores in the Java-Bali region. 
The Sumatera region, however, revealed a different phenomenon.  Table 14 shows that at 
a 95 percent confidence interval, there was no statistically significant different between Kota and 
Kabupaten on the national examination scores in the Sumatera region.  However, the ratio of 
student-teacher did have a statistically significant impact on the national examination scores in 
the Sumatera region.  A negative sign of its parameter estimation indicated that decreasing the 
student-teacher ratio most likely increased the national examination scores in the Sumatera 
region. 
 Another interesting phenomenon in the Sumatera region occurred as well.  Table 14 
shows that, at a 95 percent confidence interval, the budget for the teaching-learning process had 
a negatively significant impact on the national examination scores in the Sumatera region, 
indicating that allocating more budgets for the teaching-learning process seemed to have direct 
correlation on decreasing national examination scores.  This phenomenon was completely 
contradictory to the researcher’s argument that allocating more budgets for the teaching-learning 
process would increase the quality of education.  The researcher argues that the inefficiency of 
budget allocation on teaching-learning process in the Sumatera region may be influenced by 
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other factors, including low quality of teachers11.   Appendix E shows that, in 2002/03, for about 
66.07 percent of public junior secondary school teachers in Sumatera region possessed non-
graduate degrees.  These teachers may not be able to use the utilities, instruments, or facilities 
provided for teaching-learning process effectively.   This condition, therefore, may result in 
negative impact on efforts to improve the quality of education.  
The following figures may be able to provide another possible explanation of the 
negative relationship between budgets for the teaching-learning process and national 
examination scores in Sumatera region.  In this particular case, the researcher would say that an 
inefficiency and an ineffectiveness of budget allocation occurred in the Sumatera region, which 
impacts student achievement.  Let us compare the findings provided in Research Question 2 and 
3.  Table 11 shows that the Kota and Kabupaten in the Java-Bali region had no statistically 
significant different in fiscal capacities for education.  However, the figures in Table 14 shows 
that the Kota and Kabupaten in the Java-Bali region made statistically significant different in the 
student achievement.   In contrast, Table 11 shows that the Kota and Kabupaten in the Sumatera 
region made statistically significant different in the fiscal capacities for education.  However, 
Table 14 shows that the Kota and Kabupaten in the Sumatera region made no statistically 
significant difference in the student achievement.  These findings look like contradictory.  The 
possible explanation of this phenomenon is that the Kota and Kabupaten in each region differed 
in the way in which they allocated their education budget for the teaching-learning process (see 
Table 15).   
                                                 
11 In this study, the researcher defines the quality of teachers based on their years of education.  The years of 
education of public junior secondary school teachers in Indonesia are from a one-year till a doctoral degree (see 
Appendix E).  As shown in Appendix E, teachers who had less than four years of education (D1, D2, and D3 
program) and sarjana muda program are classified as non-graduate teachers. Actually, sarjana muda program has 
four years of education, but it is not equivalent and may less qualify than S1, which also has four years of education.  
Sarjana muda needs one additional year of education to be S1.  Meanwhile, teachers who earned undergraduate 
(S1), master (S2) and doctor (S3) programs are classified as graduate teachers.   
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Table 15.  Descriptive analysis of teachers’ salaries and teaching-learning expenditures per student in Java-
Bali and Sumatera region in 2002/03 based on type of districts. 
Region Type of 
Districts 
Variable N Mean 
(in Rp.000/year) 
Java-Bali Kota Salary 
Teaching 
15 
15 
8449.88 
100.40 
 Kabupaten Salary 
Teaching 
64 
64 
8471.80 
74.73 
Sumatera Kota Salary 
Teaching 
13 
13 
10,086.02 
70.76 
 Kabupaten Salary 
Teaching 
39 
39 
8,101.61 
75.68 
 
 
Table 16.  Test of mean differences (T-tests) between Kota and Kabupaten for teachers’ salaries and 
teaching-learning expenditures per student in Java-Bali and Sumatera region in 2002/03 
Region Variable df t-value p-value 
Java-Bali Salary 
Teaching 
77 
77 
0.03 
-3.94
0.9739 
0.0002
Sumatera Salary 
Teaching 
50 
50 
-2.22 
0.26
0.0309 
0.7955
 
Table 15 illustrates that the Kota in the Java-Bali region posted a larger allocation for the 
teaching-learning process (Rp. 100,400/year per student) than did the Kabupaten (Rp. 
74,730/year per student).  Based on a t-test (see Table 16), at a 95% confidence interval, the 
difference in the budget for teaching-learning process between the Kota and Kabupaten in the 
Java-Bali region made statistically significant different.  In contrast, the Kota in the Sumatera 
region had slightly a smaller budget for the teaching-learning process (Rp. 70,680/year per 
student) than did the Kabupaten (Rp. 75,680/year per student).  However, based on the t-test (see 
Table 16), at a 95% confidence interval, the difference in the budget for the teaching-learning 
process between the Kota and Kabupaten in the Sumatera region made no statistically significant 
  75
different.  These figures illustrates that such a significant different in the budget for the teaching-
learning process may impact student achievement (see the case of the Java-Bali region), but such 
a small difference in the budget for the teaching-learning process may generate no impact on 
student achievement (see the case of the Sumatera region). 
The figures in Table 15 and 16 may also be able to explain why a teacher salary is still 
not a significant factor to increase student achievement in both the Java-Bali and Sumatera 
regions.  Table 15 shows that the teachers’ salaries in the Kota in the Java-Bali region 
(Rp.8,449,880/year) was slightly smaller than those in the Kabupaten (Rp. 8,471,800/year).  
However, at a 95% confidence interval, this difference had no statistically significant (see Table 
16).  On the other hand, Table 15 shows the teachers’ salaries in the Kota in the Sumatera region 
was larger than those in the Kabupaten (Rp.10,086,020/year vs Rp. 8,101,610/year).  At a 95% 
confidence interval, this difference is statistically significant (See Table 16).  Does the difference 
in the teachers’ salaries impact student achievement?  A surprisingly result occurred.  Although 
the Kota and Kabupaten in the Java-Bali region made no significant different in the teachers’ 
salaries, the figures in Table 14 indicate that different types of districts in the Java-Bali region 
had impact on student achievement.  In contrast, the Kota and Kabupaten in the Sumatera region 
made statistically significant different in the teachers’ salaries.  The figures in Table 14, 
however, show that the different types of districts in the Sumatera region made no impact on the 
student achievement.    Why would this mystery occur?  Once again, the possible answer would 
be a combination between the teachers’ quality and the efficiency budget allocation.  The Java-
Bali region had more graduate teachers and the efficiency budget allocation.  On the other hand, 
the Sumatera region had fewer graduate teachers and the inefficiency budget allocation. 
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The figures in Table 15 would also explain another phenomenon might occur in the 
Sumatera region.  These figures tell us that the average teachers’ salaries in the Sumatera region 
were slightly higher than that in the Java-Bali region (Rp. 8,597,710/year vs Rp. 
Rp.8,467,630/year).  However, this difference is not statistically significant (p-value=0.7764).  
The figures in Appendix E, however, show that the Sumatera region had a larger percentage of 
non-graduate teachers (66.07%). than that of graduate teachers (33.93%).  So, what do these all 
figures mean?   The two big determining factors of teachers’ salaries in Indonesia are: a) Level 
of education; and b) years of experience.  The higher level of education the higher the salaries 
are, and the more years of experience the higher the salaries are.  The figures show that the 
Sumatera region had a larger percentage of non-graduate teachers with higher average salaries.  
The researcher argues that the higher average salaries in the Sumatera region occurred may be 
more likely due to the more years of experience.  Does this situation impact on student 
achievement?  Table 14 shows that the teachers’ salaries in the Sumatera region made no 
significant impact on student achievement.  As a result, it may also indicate that years of 
experience in the Sumatera region may have no impact on student achievement.  Does the same 
phenomenon occur in the Java-Bali region too?   Unfortunately, the researcher was unable to 
analyze the Java-Bali region because the percentage of graduate and non-graduate teachers in the 
Java-Bali was relatively close (48.37% vs 51.63%).  Thus, the researcher could not predict which 
group of teachers was more dominant in determining the average salaries in the Java-Bali region.  
The researcher, therefore, strongly recommends carrying out such a study for this particular issue 
in both the Java-Bali and Sumatera region.  The future study, hopefully, could explain the impact 
years of experience on student achievement more accurately. 
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4.4 SUMMARY 
The current decentralized system in Indonesia provided better budget allocations for education.  
The fiscal capacities for education at districts increased.  Unfortunately, increasing the fiscal 
capacities for education has led to increasing disparities in education expenditures per student, 
meaning the imbalance in fiscal capacities for education across districts increased.  Some 
districts had high abilities to increase their fiscal capacities for education; other districts had low 
ones.     
The ability to increase the fiscal capacities for education between the Kota and 
Kabupaten effected differently to the disparities in fiscal capacities for education.  The Kota in 
the Sumatera region succeeded only in widening the gap in fiscal capacities for education 
between the Kota and Kabupaten.   Increasing fiscal capacities for education in the Kota in the 
Sulawesi region, however, reduced the gap between the two.   Meanwhile, the ability to increase 
the fiscal capacities for education between the Kota and Kabupaten in the Java-Bali region 
relatively did not effect much change.  It was relatively small.  However, the increase in the 
fiscal capacities for education in the Kabupaten in the Kalimantan region caused the largest gap 
in fiscal capacities for education between the Kota and Kabupaten.   
Some factors involved in increasing the disparities in fiscal capacities for education in 
Indonesia.  The DAU per capita and the district types made significant contribution to the fiscal 
capacities for education.  Districts in both the Java-Bali and Sumatera regions were highly 
dependent upon the DAU to subsidy the education sector development.  Districts which received 
larger general allocation funds (DAU) per capita were also more likely to allocate more funding 
for education whether or not they were poor or wealthy districts.  This fact was reflected by the 
finding that district GRDP per capita in the Java-Bali and Sumatera regions had no statistically 
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significant impact on the education expenditures per student.  It indicates that local authorities 
may have no significant support for education sector development.  The richer of such districts 
did not necessarily mean a greater allocation of funding for education. 
In addition, the Kota and Kabupaten also differed in the way that they allocated funding 
for education.  The Kota in the Sumatera region tended to allocate significantly more for 
education than did the Kabupaten.  At the same time, the Kota in the Java-Bali region did not 
allocate significantly more for education than the Kabupaten.   
Ensuring enough funding for education, therefore, is essential to support education 
development.  However, it is not enough to guarantee that the education quality will improve.  It 
depends on how the funding will be used.  Thus, the use of funding in an appropriate way 
becomes an important factor in education quality improvement as well as other factors which 
relate to education quality, such as quality of teachers.  A combination between efficiency budget 
allocation and teacher’s quality, therefore, became a key of quality improvement.  
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5.0  SUMMARY, IMPLICATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This final chapter provides summary of the study as well as implications of its findings and 
recommendations for further research.  This chapter starts with the summary of the study.  The 
implications of the study are discussed in the following section guided by the study findings.  
The chapter is closed with suggestion for further study.  
5.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
The main purpose of the current study was to identify whether the current decentralized system 
in Indonesia increases disparities in educational expenditures across districts and its impact on 
the quality of education.  Data of 1999/00 and 2002/03 covering information about public junior 
secondary school expenditures, demographic and socio-economics of districts were collected.  In 
the current study, the researcher was able to obtain information of 288 districts for 1999/00 data 
(86.49 % of the 333 total districts in 1999/00) and 236 districts for 2002/03 data (53.64 % of the 
440 total districts in 2002/03). 
 To accomplish the objective of the study, the following research questions were 
addressed: 
1. What characteristics of disparities in education expenditures occurred across the 
districts?  
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2. How do geographic, demographic and socio-economic conditions of districts impact 
the disparities in education expenditures? 
3. Do the disparities in education expenditures impact student achievement? 
 
To investigate disparities in education expenditures per student as stated in research 
question 1, the researcher calculated coefficients of variance of 181 districts in both 1999/00 and 
2002/03.  These districts were also grouped into 5 regions: Java and Bali, Sumatera, Kalimantan, 
Sulawesi, and Other.  A coefficient of variance, then, was calculated for each region.  The 
researcher also provided a robust regression analysis to answer research question 2 and 3.  Data 
from 236 districts in 2002/03 was used in this analysis.  Because of either an inappropriate linear 
model or an inadequate number of observations needed to run the robust regression analysis, the 
analysis was only able to apply to data of the Java-Bali and Sumatera regions.  The findings of 
this current study are summarized in the following sections.   
5.1.1 Disparities in Education Expenditures 
The current decentralized system in Indonesia provided better budget allocations for education.  
The fiscal capacities for education at districts increased.  Unfortunately, increasing the fiscal 
capacities for education has led to increasing disparities in education expenditures per student, 
meaning the imbalance in fiscal capacities for education across districts increased.  Some 
districts had high abilities to increase their fiscal capacities for education; other districts had low 
ones.   This condition also increased the disparities in fiscal capacities for education among the 
region.  The Kalimantan region, for example, provided better fiscal capacities for education.  
Unfortunately, this increased the imbalance in fiscal capacities for education across districts.   In 
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contrast, the Java-Bali made a better performance.  Its fiscal capacities for education increased 
with lower disparities across the districts. 
 The fiscal capacities for education also differed between Kota and Kabupaten.  The Kota 
and Kabupaten varied on the way in which they allocated funding for education.  The Kota, 
generally, had a higher and a larger increment of education expenditures per student than did the 
Kabupaten.  This illustrates that the Kota had a larger fiscal capacity for education as well as its 
greater effort to increase the fiscal capacity for education.  This phenomenon occurred in the 
Kota in the Java-Bali, Sumatera and Sulawesi regions.  Meanwhile, a larger increment of fiscal 
capacities for education at the Kabupaten occurred only in the Kalimantan Region. 
The ability to increase the fiscal capacities for education between the Kota and 
Kabupaten effected differently in the disparities in fiscal capacities for education.  Kota in 
Sumatera region succeeded only in widening the gap in fiscal capacities for education between 
the Kota and Kabupaten.   Increasing fiscal capacities for education in the Kota in the Sulawesi 
region, however, reduced the gap between the two.   Meanwhile, the ability to increase the fiscal 
capacities for education between the Kota and Kabupaten in the Java-Bali region relatively did 
not effect much change.  It was relatively small.  However, the increase in the fiscal capacities 
for education in the Kabupaten in the Kalimantan region caused the largest gap in fiscal 
capacities for education between the Kota and Kabupaten.   
5.1.2 Factors that Impact Disparities in Education Expenditures 
Some factors involved in increasing the disparities in fiscal capacities for education in Indonesia.  
The DAU per capita and the district types made significant contribution to the fiscal capacities 
for education.  Districts in both the Java-Bali and Sumatera regions were highly dependent upon 
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the DAU to subsidy the education sector development.  This highly dependency on the DAU is 
also strengthened by the finding that the GRDP percapita in both regions made no statistically 
significant impact on the education expenditures per student.  It indicates that local authorities 
may have no significant support for education sector development.  The richer of such districts 
(the districts with higher GRDP per capita) did not necessarily mean a greater allocation of 
funding for education. 
The Kota and Kabupaten in the Java-Bali and Sumatera region also differed in the way 
that they allocated funding for education.  The Kota in the Sumatera region tended to have a 
larger funding allocation for education than did the Kabupaten.  This result was quite similar to 
the preliminary finding provided in Research Question 1 that the Kota in the Sumatera region 
posted larger education expenditures per student than did the Kabupaten.   In contrast, the Kota 
and Kabupaten in the Java-Bali region made no statistically significant different in providing 
fiscal capacities for education.   This condition may also explain why in 2002/03 the Java-Bali 
region had a lower disparity in fiscal capacities for education than did the Sumatera region (see 
Table 5). 
In addition, the central government enforcement that districts should support the nine-
year compulsory basic education program, however, still appeared to be ineffective in both the 
Java-Bali and the Sumatera regions.  The GER of junior secondary schools in both the Java-Bali 
and Sumatera regions made no statistically significant impact on education expenditures per 
student.  Districts with larger GER do not always indicate a greater allocation of funding for 
education. 
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5.1.3 Disparities in Education Expenditures and Educational Quality 
Ensuring enough funding for education is essential to support education development.  However, 
it is not enough to guarantee that the education quality will improve.  It depends on how the 
funding will be used.  Thus, the use of funding in an appropriate way becomes an important 
factor in education quality improvement as well as other factors which relate to education 
quality, such as quality of teachers.  The current study found that a teacher salary was not a 
significant factor to improve student achievement in both the Java-Bali and Sumatera region, but 
allocating budget for the teaching-learning process impacted student achievement in these two 
regions.  The way in which the Kota and Kabupaten allocated the funding was also a factor to 
improve student achievement in the Java-Bali region.  The Kota in the Java-Bali region tended to 
have better student achievement than did the Kabupaten.   Nevertheless, allocating more funding 
for the teaching learning process in both the Kota and Kabupaten in the Java-Bali region would 
increase student achievement.  Other factors such as student-teacher ratio and class size also 
made no significant impact on student achievement in the Java-Bali region. 
The Sumatera region revealed a different phenomenon.  An inefficiency of budget 
allocation seemed to occur in the Sumatera region: allocating more budgets for the teaching-
learning process appeared to have direct correlation on decreasing student achievement. This 
phenomenon was completely contradictory to the researcher’s argument that allocating more 
budgets for the teaching-learning process would increase the quality of education.  The 
inefficiency of budget allocation on teaching-learning process in the Sumatera region may be 
influenced by other factors, including low quality of teachers.  Approximately 66.07 percent of 
public junior secondary school teachers existed in the Sumatera region only had a non-graduate 
degree.  These teachers may not be able to optimize the use the utilities, instruments, or facilities 
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provided for the teaching-learning process effectively.   This condition, therefore, would result in 
a negative impact on the efforts to improve the quality of education.    
5.2 IMPLICATION 
The study suggests that the current decentralized system in Indonesia was likely to have an 
impact on budget allocations for education.  The fiscal capacities for education at districts 
increased.  Unfortunately, increasing the fiscal capacities for education has led to increasing 
disparity in education expenditures.  It means, imbalance in fiscal capacities for education across 
the districts increased.  It is very important, therefore, to understand that increasing imbalance in 
fiscal capacities for education could give the following implications:     
5.2.1 The Role of Intergovernmental Transfer 
The current study found that the intergovernmental transfer through the DAU12 per capita made 
a significant impact on education expenditures per student; Districts with larger DAU per capita 
most likely allocated larger fiscal capacities for education.  At this point, the researcher needs to 
emphasize that the purpose of the DAU is not merely to fund education: The use of the DAU 
depended upon the decisions of local authorities, who might choose to allocate a larger portion of 
the DAU for infrastructures, roads, buildings, or other non-educational sector development.  The 
                                                 
12 General Allocation Fund (DAU) is a grant aimed at equalizing the fiscal capacities of regional governments to 
deliver public services.  It is determined by the fiscal gap: the difference between fiscal needs and fiscal capacities 
of a regional government. The Ministry of Finance transfers the DAU to local treasurers.  Based on Fiscal 
Decentralization Law No. 25/1999, the portion of DAU allocation is 10 percent at the provincial level and 90% at 
the district level. (see Chapter 2, p.24).      
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central government did not have enough power to specify the amount of the DAU budget to be 
used for a specific purpose, such as education.  Therefore, the discovery of a positive impact of 
the DAU per capita on education expenditures per student is quite important and indicates that 
the larger the DAU per capita of such a district, the greater the chances that the district will 
allocate more funding for education.       
Because the education expenditures per student were highly dependent upon the DAU per 
capita, failure in providing such an appropriate system of funding distribution could widen the 
disparities in education expenditures per student.   In the long term, this situation could impact 
the overall process of education development.  Some regions/districts would benefit from better 
education development; other regions/districts would suffer from the lack of it.  This situation 
impacts an unequal access to better and qualified education for children in the differing regions.  
This widening gap in education opportunities between students in the rich and poor areas has 
become one of the most frequently mentioned problems in the implementation of decentralized 
programs (Adams, 2002b). The central government needs to take a more active and significant 
role in order to reduce this gap.  One of ways in which the central government can do is by 
providing an intergovernmental transfer in an appropriate way.  The central government should 
take into consideration the local fiscal capacities before it allocates the funding.   
The researcher argues that increasing the GRDP per capita of a district should have a 
positive impact on education expenditures per student.  More local financial support for 
education should be in place.  This current study, however, found that those districts with larger 
GRDP per capita in both the Java-Bali and Sumatera regions made no significant impact on 
fiscal capacities for education.  The insignificance of GRDP per capita to education expenditures 
per student indicates that local governments still provide too little financial support for education 
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sector development, and seemed, instead, to be highly dependent upon intergovernmental 
transfers through the DAU.   
The researcher, therefore, suggests that in order to reach a condition of fiscal neutrality, 
an interrelationship should be established between local financial support and central 
government financial intervention as revenue sources for education.  This principle suggests that 
children should have equal access to education regardless of the economic condition of the area 
in which they live (Odden and Picus, 1992).   Alexander and Bedenbaugh (1971) define 
equalization as a provision in a grant program, either in the allocation, or the matching, or both, 
which gives some statutory recognition to underlying differences in the state’s relative capacities 
to raise funds from their own resources for financing a joint federal-state program, in order to 
achieve more uniform standards throughout the nation.  Based on this definition, central 
government allocation and local fiscal capacities become variables of great importance.  This 
idea implies specific targets of the intergovernmental transfers from the central government, 
suggesting that intergovernmental transfers should favor poor districts.  One of the purposes of 
this funding, therefore, is to provide equal education expenditures per student across districts, or 
at least to reduce financial gaps or disparities in financing education between the rich and the 
poor districts, and, therefore, the poor districts provide at least a minimum service standard of 
education.   This educational minimum service standard itself, of course, should be designed and 
defined further by the government.   
5.2.2 Budget Allocation Efficiencies and Education Quality 
Concerning educational quality improvement, Odden and Picus (1992) suggest that the use of 
financial resources for education should be based on an effectiveness principle.  They imply that 
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a resource inequity exists not only when sufficient resources are unavailable, but also when 
resources are not used effectively enough to produce the desired impact on student performance.  
Study findings showed that budgets for the teaching-learning process13 had a significant impact 
on student achievement, indicating that increasing budget for the teaching-learning process 
would increase student performance.  The findings of this current study supported the argument 
that effective budget allocation has a direct correlation to improved student achievement.  
 This current study found that budget size is not always related to student achievement.  In 
2002/03, different phenomena in the Java-Bali and Sumatera regions occurred.  The Java-Bali 
districts with higher budget for teaching-learning process produced higher level of student 
achievement.  In contrast, Sumatera districts with higher budget for the teaching-learning process 
in Sumatera region tended to have low student achievement.  This may result from ineffective 
and inefficient expenditures of the educational funds in the Sumatera region.   Using school 
resources efficiently to produce a better quality of education is also supported by the arguments 
of John and Morphet (1960) and Levin (1970)14.  John and Morphet (1960) point out that when 
providing additional educational inputs will cost money to obtain, then if each of additional 
inputs is unrelated to increasing performance, one might draw to a conclusion that a significant 
inefficiency exists in the schools.  Levin (1970) stresses that a school that efficiently allocates 
resources will purchase a combination of inputs geared toward maximizing the potential 
educational impact of its budget.   
                                                 
13 Education expenditures at public junior secondary schools are consisting of sub-components of expenditures.  
Those expenditures were grouped into teachers’ salaries, maintenance and rehabilitation, teaching-learning process, 
and others. This current study found that a different level of budget allocation for the teaching-learning process 
between the Kota and Kabupaten provided different results in attempts to improve student achievement.  A larger 
budget allocation for the teaching-learning process most likely increased student achievement (see Chapter 4, pp. 
73-74).   
14 .   See Chapter 2, pp. 33 
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Another possible explanation of the different impact of budget allocation on student 
achievement is that there was unequal graduate teacher distribution15.  Such unequal graduate 
teacher distribution still seems to be a common problem in education.  It occurs not just only in 
developing countries, but also in developed countries, like the United States.  Boyd, Lankford, 
Loeb, and Wycoff (2003, p.55) found that “even with increases in spending equity within states 
in the US, substantial differences remain across schools is the qualification of teachers”.  
Appendix E shows that, in 2002/03, the Jawa-Bali region had 48.37% of public junior secondary 
teachers who had graduate degrees (data source: MONE).  In contrast, the Sumatera region had 
only 33.93% (data source: MONE).  This finding, therefore, impacts not only education finance, 
but also teacher distribution policies.    
The researcher agrees that providing more funding for the teaching-learning process may 
give more opportunities for schools to purchase equipment and facilities that support the learning 
process and for children to access a better quality of education.  These efforts, however, should 
                                                 
15 . Theobald and Laine (2003) argue that teacher quality (e.g., subject matter knowledge, cognitive ability, 
selectivity of college attended) is the single most important school factor affecting student achievement.  Hanushek, 
Kain, and Rivkin (1999) reported that variations in teacher quality explain at least 7% of student test score 
differences, and they argue that this is a lower boundary.  
In this study, the researcher defines the quality of teachers based on their years of education.  The years of 
education of public junior secondary school teachers in Indonesia are from a one-year till a doctoral degree (see 
Appendix E).  As shown in Appendix E, teachers who had less than four years of education (D1, D2, and D3 
program) and sarjana muda program are classified as non-graduate teachers. Actually, sarjana muda program has 
four years of education, but it is not equivalent and may less qualify than S1, which also has four years of education.  
Sarjana muda needs one additional year of education to be S1.  Meanwhile, teachers who earned undergraduate 
(S1), master (S2) and doctor (S3) programs are classified as graduate teachers 
 
Adams (2002b) compared some studies about the impact of teachers’ experience on student achievement. 
He found no consistent results.  Some studies concluded that teachers with longer experience improve student 
achievement in India, Iran and Malaysia (Heynemen and Loxley, 1983; Beebout, 1972).  Another study showed no 
evidence that teacher experience is associated with student achievement in Indonesia (Sembiring, 1981).   
Adams (2002b) also found no consistent results in studies of the impact of teachers’ years of schooling on 
student achievement.  Teachers’ years of schooling raised student achievement in India, Thailand, and Iran 
(Heyneman and Loxley, 1983; Comber and Keeves, 1973; Beebout, 1972). Another study indicates that teachers’ 
years of schooling do not effect student achievement in Indonesia (Sembiring, 1981).   
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also included improving teachers’ knowledge and performance so that teachers can optimize the 
use of school equipment, school facilities, and technology that support and enhance the teaching-
learning process.  The researcher believes that improving teachers’ knowledge will also develop 
teachers’ motivation and attitude to produce better education for students16. 
 The problem of unequal graduate teacher distribution may also explain why student-
teacher ratio had a different impact on student achievement in the Java-Bali than in the Sumatera 
region.  This current study found that in 2002/03 districts with lower student-teacher ratio in the 
Sumatera region most likely produced higher student achievement.  In the Java-Bali region, 
however, student-teacher ratio had no significant impact on student achievement (see Table 14).  
The researcher found that in 2002/03 the student-teacher ratio (teacher’s burden) in the Java-Bali 
and Sumatera regions was relatively the same.  It was 16:1 in the Java-Bali and 15:1 in the 
Sumatera (data source: MONE).  Why, then, does student-teacher ratio have a different impact 
on student achievement from region to region?   
In this particular case, the researcher argues that although teacher’s burden in the Java-
Bali and Sumatera regions was relatively the same, the quality of teachers differed.  Appendix E 
shows that, in 2002/03, the Sumatera region had a larger percentage of non-graduate teachers 
(66.07%); conversely, the Java-Bali region had a smaller percentage of non-graduate teachers 
(51.63%).  The researcher argues that non-graduate teachers may do better in classes with fewer 
students, because of a decrease in the teacher’s burden.  In addition, decreasing student-teacher 
ratio may also mean increasing the number of teachers.  This fact, therefore, would implicate the 
education policy on teacher recruitment and distribution, and should consider the quality or at 
least the educational backgrounds of those teachers recruited. 
                                                 
16 Adams (2002b) found that studies done by Fuller and Chantavanish (1976) and Rowe et al (1966) conclude that 
teachers who expect high achievement raise student performance. 
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 This current study also found that budgets for teachers’ salaries in both the Java-Bali and 
Sumatera regions made no significant impact on student achievement (see Table 14).  This 
finding contradicts both the Levin (1970) and the Lazear (2001) argument, which suggest that 
teacher quality can be increased by paying higher salaries (see Chapter 2 p.38).   One possible 
explanation was stated in the report from the World Bank (2004), which mentioned that although 
under the current decentralized system in Indonesia the district would have a responsibility for 
hiring and paying teachers in public and private schools, except those in madrasahs, the central 
government still set the salary levels, and the promotional and reward systems for teachers.  
Districts might provide teachers with some supplementary benefits and incentives within their 
jurisdictions, but this was dependent upon district economic capabilities and/or high cost-of-
living adjustments.  No such rule existed for providing incentives or “merit-pay” for teachers due 
to their good performances in classes.  Their quality of performances in classes did not impact 
their salaries (World Bank,1989 in Bjork, 2006)17.  Teachers became less motivated to improve 
their performance (Adams, 2002b)18, which, of course, affected the quality of education. 
5.2.3 Political, Social, and Economic Stability 
The researcher realizes the difficulty or the impossibility of having a zero disparity or absolute 
equality in education expenditures per student across districts.  But, this should not hinder the 
                                                 
17 World Bank (1989 in Bjork, 2006) notices that teachers, as public employees in Indonesia, are guaranteed a basic 
salary regardless of performance on the job.  “As long as they do not upset their principals or employees in the 
provincial office of education, teachers can expect to receive regular pay increases every 4 years, regardless of their 
efforts in the classroom” (p. 135). 
 
18 Adams (2002b, p.22) argues that “apparent solutions to ineffective teaching and learning due to lack of incentives 
and motivations turn out to be complex because of organizational context.  Teachers who do not receive merit pay 
may respond not by trying harder but rather by reducing their efforts (see Chapter 2, pp.39-40).   
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government’s efforts to reduce the gap.  These efforts, however, are sometimes political rather 
than educational decisions.  There is an argument that the significance of continuing disparities 
lies in the threat which they pose to national integration rather than to the extent that they betray 
divergence from the world norms of educational equality (UNESCO, 1981).  In other words, the 
objective of reducing regional disparities in educational development can undoubtedly be 
justified for ethical reasons of justice and social equity, but in practice it is often prescribed quite 
simply as a political necessity (UNESCO, 1981).   
Chapter 2 of the current study addresses political consideration as a hidden factor behind 
the process of decentralization in Indonesia.  One reason the central government adopted a 
decentralized system was to save the national integrity.   Strong pressures from local authorities 
to be granted a broader range of power accelerated the process of decentralization, thereby, 
giving local districts the authority to manage their sector development, including funding 
allocation based on priorities.  The central government did not have the power to require local 
districts to allocate specific percentages of their total budget for education.  Nevertheless, this 
condition increases the chance of varying fiscal capacities for education across districts.   
Providing equal opportunities and capabilities to local authorities for education sector 
development becomes the government’s challenge19.  Ensuring adequate and equal funding to 
support education sector development, therefore, is essential in establish and maintain economic, 
social, and political stability.   “Education also may contribute to poverty reduction, to 
improvements in income distribution, and to various dimensions of social, demographic, and 
                                                 
19 Thomas (1983) argues that the politics-education interaction may occur when one region of a country enjoys 
superior educational opportunities – more and better school facilities, more and better teachers.  He argues that the 
youth of the privileged region find that the superior educational facilities fit them well for influential positions in the 
civic services.  Consequently, the percentage of government officials from that region continues to increase and the 
bias of the government in favor of that specific region continues to grow.  In the long term, it could challenge the 
national stability. 
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political development” (Adams, 2002a, p.21).  Adams (2002a) also emphasizes that one of 
education’s contributions to economic growth is –possibly- by contributing to political stability.  
In this case, the researcher strongly agrees with the following Thomas’ argument (1983, p.20) as 
well: 
“Nearly every nation’s development scheme includes a manpower production 
component that is assigned to the education system.  Schools and non-formal 
programs are expected to provide the kinds and amounts of workers needed to 
implement the country’s socioeconomic growth plan.  And while manpower 
production is usually viewed as an economic matter, it is necessarily political as 
well since every economic system is intimately linked to the particular political 
structure it supports.  Therefore, how well the education system carries out the 
manpower assignment influences the stability and longevity of the existing 
political organization”. 
 
However, one may ask how significant is the contribution of basic education, including 
primary and secondary education, to social, economic, and political stability in a country?.   
Some politicians may argue that investments in higher education may be more beneficial than 
investments in basic education, because they can better accelerate a country’s development.  This 
opinion may be right, but developing a better society and a fundamental thinking of an ideology 
and a national identity is essential for strong national economics and for political stability.  
Balancing local and national identities is a partial concern in Indonesia, because it is comprised 
of multi-ethnic groups, many local languages, and many cultures.  Strengthening national 
identity needs to occur at the early stages of education such as primary and junior secondary 
levels.  Children need to learn both how to behave in local societies and how to be proud as 
citizens of the country.   
Moreover, education quality in Indonesia thus has two components.  First, an emphasis 
on appreciation of both local cultures and national identity strengthen civil society in Indonesia.  
Second, an emphasis on high quality language and math skills helps to prepare students for 
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global economic competitiveness. If the government ignores the low fiscal capacities for 
education in certain districts, it could lead to an increase in the unskilled labor force, 
unemployment rates, and the social burden. All three contribute to political and economic 
instability.  If it were left to districts to increase their fiscal capacities for education in order to 
support or finance education development and improve the quality of education, then parents 
would likely have to bear that burden20.  Poor families would be affected most; their children 
may be forced to drop out of school – even at primary and junior secondary level, if parents were 
unable to pay. This happened during the economic crisis of 1997.  These children would be 
denied access to the knowledge and skills.  They need to grow up successfully.  As a result, the 
gap between the poor and the rich would become wider21, and this would eventually impact 
political, economic, and social stability in the long run.    
                                                 
20 One of the goals of educational decentralization is expanding parental participation in order to bolster local 
support for the schools and generate additional resources (Bjork, 2006).  The MONE document pointed out that  “it 
is expected that school personnel honor the participation and support of the parents and communities. That kind of 
mutual respect and mutual responsibilities can be cultivated in the management of education” (MONE, 1994 in 
Bjork, 2006, p. 136).  However, Bjork (2006) observed that “parental participation was construed as making 
financial contributions to schools “ (pp.144-145).  
 
21 Harrison (1976, pp.188-189) points out that “persons with more schooling find it easier to obtain jobs with high 
social status, and to earn the high salaries associated with those jobs.  These people with more schooling, which was 
obtained at higher quality schools that spent more on each student, are apt to be especially successful in the job 
market.  The quality of schools makes positive contribution to economic success, controlling for the quantity of 
schooling.”   
Harrison (1976, p.189) also argues that “the areas with less economic development, schooling has a 
particular ability to increase incomes.  Thus areas with low income and low schooling are places where educational 
investments and schooling have a particular ability to produce a high rate of returns, when one compares marginal 
incomes and marginal schooling.” Therefore, he concerns that where the average level of schooling is low, the 
distribution of schooling tends to be highly unequal, controlling for other key variables that shape educational 
inequality.  As a result, when the strata of society are highly differentiated by schooling, the result of low schooling 
is social inequality.  And, when the schooling is unequal, the distribution of incomes tends to be highly unequal.  
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5.3 RECOMMENDATION FOR POLICIES AND FUTURE STUDIES 
A decentralized educational system in Indonesia is underway.  However, many mechanisms need 
to be re-formatted from the previous to the current system.  New processes are required to 
transfer governmental structures not only administratively, but also financially.  In this case, the 
researcher is concerned more with the issue of financing the education sector itself more than 
with the details of administration.  The researcher argues that misconduct in financing education 
sector may result in a loss of education quality.  Current program may not being implemented in 
the appropriate way. It is, therefore, necessary to emphasize the importance of increasing the 
number of future studies related to educational finance issues in Indonesia.  In order to create 
better future studies, the researcher wishes to make the following recommendations:  
First, the current study found that the imbalance in fiscal capacities for education was 
greater within each region rather than among regions.  The future studies, therefore, should focus 
more on sub-national regions.  In order to produce more in-depth analyses of the factors involved 
in generating increasing the disparities in education expenditures per student in a specific region. 
Secondly, the current study found that the ways districts allocated their funds for the 
teaching learning process which had a significant impact on student achievement22.  A larger 
budget for the teaching-learning process may be more likely to increase student achievement.  
The researcher, therefore, strongly recommends that the government should better monitor how 
schools spend their funds for education to ensure that there will be an adequate funding for the 
teaching-learning process. 
                                                 
 
22 This current study found that a different level of budget allocation for the teaching-learning process between the 
Kota and Kabupaten provided different results in attempts to improve student achievement.  A larger budget 
allocation for the teaching-learning process most likely increased student achievement (see Chapter 4, Pp. 73-74).   
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Thirdly, the current study also found that the teacher’s salary was not a significant factor 
on student achievement.  This occurred since teachers’ performance in classes did not have 
impact on their salaries.  Teachers became less motivated to improve their performance.  The 
researcher, therefore, strongly recommends that such a government’s policy in providing rewards 
or incentives (merit-pay) for teachers due to their good performances in classes becomes one 
option to increase teachers’ motivation to improve their performance in classes. 
Fourthly, the current study also found that the existing disparities across regions involved 
not only fiscal capacities for education, but also the distribution of graduate teachers.  The 
researcher, therefore, strongly recommends that any efforts to increase the quality of education 
should not merely provide sufficient funding for education, but also improve the quality of 
teachers.  Future studies, therefore, should pay more attention to the teacher quality as a variable 
in explaining the quality of education in Indonesia.  This also implies recognizing to what degree 
does the investment of a district to improve teacher quality as well.  This also suggests that 
government investment of teacher education may have produced significant results. 
Fifthly, the researcher agrees that such investments are required for improving continuing 
teacher quality.  This could be done by allocating funds for pre-service teacher training to 
upgrade teachers’ academic skills or in-service teacher training to improve performance of the 
existing teachers.  The investments in pre-service teacher training may improve teacher’s 
academic skills with a consequence of a large funding with a limited number of teachers as 
targets.  On the other hand, investments in in-service teacher training may improve teachers’ 
performance in class.  Many regions have limited budget.  Consequently, the researcher strongly 
recommends that future studies are needed to determine what kinds of teacher training are more 
  96
effective and efficient in contributing to student achievement in each region.  Future studies in 
such a specific region, therefore, are also recommended.  
Sixthly, greater funding is needed to improve teacher quality.  Central government need 
to urge districts to earmark funds from the DAU to support teachers’ quality improvement.  
Government monitoring through MONE may be required to ensure both the budget allocation for 
education and the management of equity issues.  In this case, districts’ transparency around how 
the district allocates funding for teachers’ quality improvement is strongly required.   
Seventhly, a reliable data bank that supports educational finance studies, especially at the 
Ministry of National Education (MONE) is needed.   During the data collection period of the 
current study, the researcher found missing or incomplete data related to the educational finance 
information at MONE.   Therefore, for the current study, the researcher was only able to collect 
data for about 87.09% of 1999/00 and 53.64% of 2002/03 in which the educational finance 
information was available.  MONE needs to both generate a more complete data and to require 
strengthen compliance by MONE for data requests.   This lack of enforcement could have 
resulted from too little use of educational finance information to support educational policies of 
the previous system.  In addition, few studies exist in the educational finance field in Indonesia.  
Increasing the number of educational finance studies could result in greater demand for 
education finance data.  This ‘virtual cycle’ could create a mechanism for better educational 
finance development.  
 Finally, because of a lack of adequate data / information from other regions, the current 
study, using district level as a unit analysis, analyzed data only from the Java-Bali and Sumatera 
regions.  The researcher, therefore, recommends that future studies use a smaller unit analysis, 
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such as sub-districts or school levels, which would provide more access to a larger amount of 
data.       
APPENDIX A  
EDUCATION EXPENDITURES OF PUBLIC JUNIOR SECONDARY SCHOOLS,  1999/00 
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APPENDIX B   
EDUCATION EXPENDITURES OF PUBLIC JUNIOR SECONDARY SCHOOLS, 2002/03 
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APPENDIX C.   
EDUCATION EXPENDITURES PER STUDENT IN 1999/00 AND 2002/03 IN 185 
DISTRICTS 
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APPENDIX D   
NORMAL PROBABILITY PLOTS OF EDUCATION EXPENDITURES IN 1999/00 AND 
2002/03 IN 185 DISTRICTS 
1.  A Normal Probability Plot for Education Expenditures per Student 
  in 1999/00 
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2.  A Normal Probability Plot for Education Expenditures per Student 
  in 2002/03 
 
         5750+                                                  * 
             | 
             | 
             | 
             | 
             | 
             |                                                 * 
             | 
             |                                         ++*****+++ 
             |                               +++++++***** 
             |                   ******************* 
          250+** *****************+ 
             +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ 
                  -2        -1         0        +1        +2 
 
APPENDIX E 
PUBLIC JUNIOR SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION, 2002/03 
 
 
 
  117
  
 
  118
APPENDIX F 
SAS PROGRAMS 
1. SAS Program for calculating coefficients of variance 
 
Libname pur ‘c:\dissertation’;                 
Option pageno=1; 
Proc Format; 
Value Typefmt 0='Kab' 1='Kota'; 
Value Regfmt 1='Java+Bali' 2='Sumatera' 3='Kalimantan' 4='Sulawesi' 5='Other'; 
Value provfmt 1='DKI Jakarta' 2='West Java' 3='Central Java' 4='Yogyakarta' 5='East 
Java' 6='Aceh' 7='North Sumatera' 8='West Sumatera' 9='Riau' 10='Jambi' 11='South 
Sumatera' 12='lampung' 13='West Kalimantan' 14='Central Kalimantan' 15='South 
Kalimantan' 16='East Kalimantan' 17='North Sulawesi' 18='Central Sulawesi' 
19='South Sulawesi' 20='Southeast Sulawesi' 21='Maluku' 22='Bali' 23='West Nusa 
Tenggara' 24='East Nusa Tenggara' 25='Bengkulu' 26='Papua';  
 
Data Disparity; 
Format Type Typefmt. Reg Regfmt. Prov provfmt.; 
Set pur.dispar; 
Expinf02=exp02/(1+inflasi);/*Calculating Exp02-03 with inflation factor */ 
 
proc print data=disparity; 
  Var Prov District Reg exp99 exp02 inflasi expinf02;   
run; 
 
/*Detecting outliers by normal probality plots */ 
Proc univariate data=disparity plot normal; 
  var exp99 expinf02; 
  Qqplot Exp99 expinf02/normal (mu=est sigma=est); 
run; 
 
Data dispar2; 
Set Disparity; 
 
/*Deleting the outliers based on normal probability plots*/ 
if exp99 >= 1000 then delete; 
if expinf02 >= 2800 then delete; 
 
Proc univariate data=dispar2 plot normal; 
  var exp99 expinf02; 
  Qqplot Exp99 expinf02/normal (mu=est sigma=est); 
run; 
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/*Calculating the disparities in education expenditures across the 
districts....INDONESIA*/ 
 
Proc means data=Dispar2; 
var Exp99 Expinf02; 
run; 
 
/*Calculating the disparities in education expenditures among the region*/ 
/*
 
Based on data Dispar2*/ 
Data dispar3; 
Input Reg $ Exp99x Expinfl02x Kota99 Kotainfl02 Kab99 Kabinfl02; 
Cards; 
Java_Bali   365.36  621.91 400.93  670.04 356.96  610.55 
Sumatera    390.34  638.07 413.87  733.48 379.32  593.36 
Kalimantan  443.62  806.91 352.63  519.57 457.62  851.12 
Sulawesi    545.30  840.41 430.04  771.29 565.64  852.60 
Other       336.13  537.68   .        .   336.13  537.68 
; 
 
Proc means data=Dispar3; 
var Exp99x Expinfl02x Kota99 Kotainfl02 Kab99 Kabinfl02; 
run; 
 
/*Calculating the disparities in education expenditures by the region*/ 
 
Proc sort data=Dispar2 out=dispsort; 
 by reg; 
run; 
Proc means data=dispsort; 
var Exp99 Expinf02; 
by reg; 
run; 
 
/*Calculating the disparities in education expenditures by the type of 
region*/ 
 
Proc sort data=dispar2 out=disptype; 
 by type; 
run; 
Proc means data=disptype; 
var EXP99 EXPinf02; 
by type; 
run; 
 
/*Calculating the disparities in education expenditures by the region and 
type of region*/ 
 
Proc sort data=dispar2 out=dispregtype; 
 by reg type; 
run; 
Proc means data=dispregtype; 
var EXP99 EXPinf02; 
by reg type; 
run; 
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2.   SAS program for Education Expenditures per student in 2002/03 by a Robust 
Regression Analysis. 
 
Libname pur 'g:\purwanto'; 
Option Pageno=1; 
 
Proc Format; 
  Value Typefmt 0='Kab' 1='Kota'; 
  Value Regfmt 1='Java+Bali' 2='Sumatera' 3='Kalimantan' 4='Sulawesi' 5='Other'; 
  Value Reg1fmt 1='Java+Bali' 0='Others';  
  Value Reg2fmt 1='Sumatera' 0= Others'; '
  Value Reg3fmt 1='Kalimantan' 0='Others'; 
  Value Reg4fmt 1='Sulawesi' 0='Others'; 
 
/*Note: JEXP_STD, GRDP_Cap, DAU_Cap are in Rp.000*/   
 
Data JSEEXP; 
Set pur.disertasi; 
format regB regfmt. type typefmt.; 
 
/*developing dummy variables for region*/ 
If regB=1 then Reg1=1 else reg1=0 ; ; 
If regB=2 then Reg2=1; else Reg2=0; 
If regB=3 then Reg3=1; else Reg3=0; 
If regB=4 then Reg4=1; else Reg4=0; 
run; 
 
proc sort data=jseexp out=srt; 
by regb; 
run; 
 
proc means data=srt; 
 var jexp_std; 
  by regb; 
run; 
 
proc corr; 
  var JEXP_STD Type Density GRDP_Cap DAU_Cap GER; 
run; 
 
/*Using OLS Regression Analysis */ 
 
Proc reg data=JSEEXP; 
 Model JEXP_STD=reg1 reg2 reg3 reg4 Type GRDP_Cap DAU_Cap GER/spec vif tol; 
    output out=JSE1 p=phat r=rhat rstudent=r h=lev cookd=cd dffits=dffit; 
 Plot r.*p.='*';    
 run; 
regeffect: test reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4; 
quit; 
proc univariate data=JSE1 normal; 
     var rhat; 
  qqplot rhat /normal (mu=est sigma=est); 
run; 
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/* Using a Robust Regression Analysis */ 
/* For all Districts */ 
 
Proc robustreg method=lts fwls data=jseexp; 
  Model JEXP_STD=reg1 reg2 reg3 reg4 Type GER GRDP_Cap DAU_Cap /diagnostics; 
  Output out=robust r=resid sr=stdres; 
run; 
 
/* A Chow Test */ 
Data cleaning; 
set robust; 
if abs(stdres)<3; 
proc reg data=cleaning; 
  Model JEXP_STD=Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Type GRDP_Cap DAU_Cap GER/spec vif tol; 
run; 
regeffect: test reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4; 
quit; 
proc univariate data=JSE2 normal; 
     var rhat; 
  qqplot rhat /normal (mu=est sigma=est); 
run; 
 
/*So tingr  data by region */ 
Proc sort data=Jseexp out=jsesort; 
by regB; 
run; 
 
/* Checking the existing outliers at each region */ 
 
Proc reg data=JSEsort; 
 Model JEXP_STD=Type GRDP_Cap DAU_Cap GER/spec vif tol; 
    output out=JSE1 p=phat r=rhat rstudent=r h=lev cookd=cd dffits=dffit; 
    Plot r.*p.='*'; 
 by regB; 
 run; 
 
/* Using Robust Regression Analysis */ 
/* By Region */ 
 
Proc robustreg  method=lts fwls data=jsesort; 
  Model JEXP_STD=type GER GRDP_Cap DAU_Cap/diagnostics; 
  Output out=robust2 r=resid sr=stdres; 
  by regB; 
run; 
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3.   SAS program for National Examination Scores in 2002/03 by a Robust 
Regression Analysis. 
Option pageno=1; 
Proc Format; 
  Value Typefmt 0='Kab' 1='Kota'; 
  Value Regfmt 1 'Java+Bali' 2 'Sumatera' 3='Kalimantan' 4='Sulawesi' 5='Other'; = =
  Value Reg1fmt 1='Java+Bali' 0='Others';  
  Value Reg2fmt 1='Sumatera' 0='Others'; 
  Value Reg3fmt 1='Kalimantan' 0='Others'; 
  Value Reg4fmt 1='Sulawesi' 0='Others'; 
 
Libname pur 'c:\dissertation'; 
 
/*Note : The Names of variables : Prov Type Reg Ratio Size Salary Teaching 
Maint ExpStd NES*/ 
 
Data NEM; 
set pur.nes; 
Format reg regfmt. type typefmt.; 
If NES < 1 then delete; 
 
/*Pr vidio ng Correlation Matrix */ 
proc corr data=nem; 
  var NES Type Reg Ratio Size Salary Teaching Maint ExpStd; 
run; 
 
/*Re resg sion Analysis for all data*/ 
Proc reg Data=NEM; 
  Model NES=Reg1 reg2 reg3 reg4 Type Ratio size salary teaching /spec VIF; 
    output out=score1a p=phat1a r=rhat1a rstudent=r1a dffits=dffit1a; 
    Plot r.*p.='*'; 
run; 
regeffect: test reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4; 
quit; 
proc univariate data=score1a normal; 
     var rhat1a; 
  qqplot rhat1a /normal (mu=est sigma=est); 
run; 
 
/*Us ng Robusti  Regression Analysis for all data*/ 
Proc robustreg method=lts fwls data=NEM 
  Model NES=Reg1 reg2 reg3 reg4 Type ratio Size Salary Teaching/diagnostics; 
  Output out=robustnem r=resid sr=stdres; 
run; 
 
/* A Chow Test*/ 
Data cleaning; 
set robustnem; 
if a s(sb tdres)<3; 
Proc reg Data=cleaning; 
  Title 'All Districts'; 
  Model NES=Reg1 reg2 reg3 reg4 Type Ratio Size Salary Teaching /spec VIF; 
    output out=score1b p=phat1a r=rhat1a rstudent=r1a dffits=dffit1a; 
    Plot r.*p.='*'; 
run; 
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regeffect: test reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4; 
quit; 
run; 
 
proc univariate data=score1b normal; 
     var rhat1a; 
  qqplot rhat1a /normal (mu=est sigma=est); 
run; 
 
/*Analyzing data by each region */ 
 
Proc sort data=NEM out=score2; 
  by reg type; 
run; 
 
/*Robust Regression Analysis for each region*/ 
 
Proc robustreg method=lts fwls data=score2; 
  Model NES=Type Ratio size salary teaching /diagnostics; 
  Output out=robust2 r=resid sr=stdres; 
  by reg; 
run; 
 
Data clean2; 
set robust2; 
if abs(stdres)<3; 
 
proc sort data=clean2 out=cleansort; 
by reg type; 
run; 
 
/* Mean difference by T-test for data without outliers*/ 
/*for each region */ 
 
proc ttest data=cleansort; 
  class type; 
  var salary teaching; 
  by reg; 
run; 
 
/* Mean difference by T-test for data without outliers*/ 
/*for the Java-Bali and Sumatera region */ 
 
data JB_SMTR; 
set cleansort; 
if reg=1 or reg=2; 
proc ttest data=JB_SMTR; 
  class reg; 
  var salary teaching; 
run; 
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